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Environmental Change, Food Crises and Violence in Dassanech, 
Southern Ethiopia
Yntiso Gebre
Abstract
This paper examines pastoral conflicts in Dassanech area, Southern Ethiopia, against the 
background of environmental change and food insecurity. The study reveals a relationship 
between environmental stress and the escalation of inter-ethnic pastoral conflicts in the area.
Nevertheless, pastoral conflicts in Dassanech are complex and strongly challenge the idea of 
a direct causal link between concrete environmental factors and specific conflict incidents. 
Socio-cultural and economic factors cause or trigger conflicts independently or in conjunc-
tion with ecological processes. Furthermore, infrastructure and large-scale agricultural deve-
lopment project are likely to influence the social configuration in the Omo River basin and 
therefore, possibly, also local conflict dynamics. The paper argues that local social and cultural 
factors play an important role for conflict action, and that, therefore, the study of resource 
conflicts must not be reduced to economic, agricultural, and ecological aspects.
Zusammenfassung
Das Papier analysiert Konflikte zwischen Gruppen mobiler Tierhalter_innen in Dassanech, 
Südathiopien, im Zusammenhang mit Umweltwandel und Ernährungsunsicherheit. Die Stu-
die verweist auf eine Beziehung zwischen Umweltveränderungen und der Eskalation von 
inter-ethnischen Konflikten im Untersuchungsgebiet. Gleichzeitig betont der Autor, dass 
Intergruppenkonflikte zwischen mobilen Tierhalter_innen komplexe Phänomene sind und 
kein unmittelbarer Kausalzusammenhang zwischen ökologischen Faktoren und Gewalt-
handeln besteht. Gesellschaftlich-kulturelle und ökonomische Faktoren verstärken und ve-
ursachen Konflikte unabhängig von oder in Wechselwirkung mit ökologischen Prozessen. 
Darüber hinaus beeinflussen in der Region Infrastrukturprojekte sowie die Entwicklung 
großflächiger Landwirtschaft die sozialen Bedingungen und infolge möglicherweise auch die 
Konfliktdynamiken. Gebre Yntiso argumentiert, dass lokale soziale und kulturelle Faktoren 
eine bedeutende Rolle für Konflikthandeln spielen und Konflikte um natürliche Ressourcen 
deshalb nicht auf ökonomische und (agrar-)ökologische Aspekte reduziert werden dürfen.
Research for this paper has been conducted within the project „Local conflict dynamics: Environ-
mental change, food crises, and violence in sub-Saharan Africa“ (2010-12). Funding was provi-
ded by the German foundation for peace research (Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung - DSF).
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1. Introduction
Inter-ethnic	conflicts	in	the	lower	Omo	valley	(where	the	Dassanech	people	live)	have	steadily	
increased	in	intensity	and	frequency.	It	appears	that	resource	scarcity	(which	could	be	explained	
in	terms	of	natural	and	social	factors),	the	growing	pressure	over	fast	dwindling	resources,	and	
certain	cultural	factors	are	the	driving	force	of	conflict	dynamics.	There	are	clear	indications	
that	 the	human	and	 livestock	populations	 in	 the	 study	area	have	been	 increasing.	Although	
adequate	meteorological	records	are	lacking	to	support	arguments,	climate	change	may	have	
contributed	to	the	frequent	drought	that	(together	with	other	factors)	caused	scarcity	of	water	
and	pasture.	Based	on	the	available	evidence,	the	line	of	argument	pursued	in	this	report	is	that	
environmental	change,	population	growth,	and	increment	 in	 livestock	size	combined	with	a	
host	of	other	factors	exacerbated	competition	over	vital	resources	and	the	escalation	of	intra-	
and	inter-ethnic	conflicts	in	the	study	area.	
The	link	between	the	condition	of	resources	(scarcity	or	abundance)	and	conflict	has	long	been	
theorized.	While	some	writers	argue	that	competition	over	scarce	resources	leads	to	inter-group	
conflict,	others	contend	that	places	endowed	with	plentiful	resources	are	also	condemned	to	
suffer	 from	conflict	 (Butler/Gates	2010).	Both	arguments	may	hold	 true	 in	different	circum-
stances.	However,	the	intra-	and	inter-ethnic	conflicts	in	Dassanech	area	cannot	be	explained	
in	terms	of	the	‘curse	of	abundance’.	Critchley	and	Terriff	(1993	in	Teshome	2010:	183)	convin-
cingly	state	that	resources	lead	to	conflict	when	they	become	increasingly	scarce,	when	they	are	
essential	for	human	survival,	and	when	they	can	be	physically	seized	or	controlled.	This	line	of	
argument	seems	to	be	consistent	with	the	experience	of	the	Dassanech.
The	Dassanech	people	(also	spelt	as	Daasanach,	Dasenach,	and	Dassanetch,	and	called	Geleb,	
Merile,	 and	Gabarich),	who	 speak	 an	East	Cushitic	 language,	 live	 in	Ethiopia	 and	Kenya	on	
the	northern	shore	of	Lake	Turkana	and	further	north	along	the	Omo	River.	The	Ethiopian	
Dassanech	(the	majority)	live	in	Dassanech	Woreda	(District),	South	Omo	Zone,	Southern	Na-
tions,	Nationalities	and	Peoples	Region	(SNNPR).	The	population	of	the	Ethiopian	Dassanech	
is	estimated	at	48,067	(CSA	2007:	84).	According	to	unpublished	data	from	the	South	Omo	Zone	
Administration,	 the	 land	area	of	 the	Dassanech	is	2,575	sq	km.	Until	2006,	 the	area	was	part	
of	the	administrative	unit	of	Kuraz	woreda.	Following	the	2006	administrative	restructuring,	
Dassanechland	was	elevated	to	a	district	level	with	its	capital	at	Omorate,	some	852	km	south	of	
Addis	Ababa.	The	Dassanech	district	is	divided	into	40	units	called	kebele.	A	kebele	is	the	lowe-
st	administrative	unit	responsible	for	government	functions	such	as	local	administration,	the	
collection	of	tax,	provision	of	extension	service	and	food	aid,	elections,	etc.	Except	for	Omorate	
(the	capital	of	the	district),	which	hosts	migrants	and	local	people,	all	other	kebeles	are	inhabi-
ted	by	agro-pastoral	Dassanech	communities.
Traditionally,	 the	Dassanech	are	divided	 into	eight	 territorial	sections	 (emeto).	These	 include	
the	Shirr,	Inkoria,	Narich,	Elele,	Riele,	Oro,	Randal,	and	Kuoro.	Despite	the	recent	re-organiza-
tion	of	the	Dassanech	society	into	‘modern’	administrative	units	by	the	government,	the	emeto	
structure	remains	strong	and	functional	throughout	the	Dassanech	territory.	Territorial	sec-
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tions,	which	are	seen	as	identity	markers	of	the	residents,	are	autonomous	in	terms	of	manag-
ing	internal	affairs	such	as	resource	use,	transfer	of	generational	power,	religious/ritual	func-
tions,	offensive/defensive	actions,	raiding,	and	conflict	resolution.	Furthermore,	the	Dassanech	
are	divided	into	eight	exogamous	and	non-territorial	clans	(turo),	namely,	Turinyerim,	Fargar,	
Galbur,	Turat,	Ili,	Mur,	Edze,	and	Tiyeme.	The	clans	reside	in	all	territorial	sections,	although	
each	section	may	not	have	all	eight	clans.	
Today,	the	Dassanech	people	are	predominantly	agro-pastoralists,	who	complement	their	in-
come	from	livestock	production	with	cultivation	of	crops	on	the	flooded	banks	of	 the	Omo	
River	and	fishing.	The	Dassanech	claim	to	have	lost	much	of	their	lands	to	Kenya	in	the	south	
and	in	the	west	during	the	last	century.	The	loss	of	land	translated	to	massive	decreases	in	the	
numbers	of	their	livestock,	which	forced	many	people	to	adopt	alternative	livelihood	strategies:	
cultivation	and	fishing.1	It	was	this	historical	process	that	turned	the	primarily	pastoral	people	
into	primarily	agro-pastoral	communities.	Cattle	and	goats	represent	the	most	commonly	rai-
sed	and	highly	valued	livestock.	Besides,	the	Dassanech	also	raise	sheep,	donkeys,	and	in	some	
parts	camels.	Sorghum	is	the	staple	food	crop	grown	in	the	area.	In	addition	to	sorghum,	the	
Dassanech	grow	some	maize	and	beans.	
The	degree	of	dependence	of	the	Dassanech	on	these	different	economic	activities	vary	from	
one	territorial	section	to	another.	The	Shiir	 (the	 largest	group),	 the	Narich,	 the	Oro,	and	the	
Kuoro	combine	livestock	and	crop	production.	The	Inkoria	and	the	Randal	rely	heavily	on	live-
stock	production,	while	the	Elele	and	Riele	count	more	on	cultivation	and	fishing1	and	less	on	
animal	husbandry.	The	variations	in	the	degree	of	dependence	on	different	economic	activities	
may	be	explained	 in	 terms	of	proximity	 to	 the	Omo	River,	 loss	of	animals	 that	necessitated	
reliance	on	other	activities,	 and	 the	 suitability	of	 locations	 for	 the	 types	of	production.	The	
lakeshore	is	reported	to	be	more	suitable	for	cattle	than	for	goats.	The	riverbank	is	best	suited	
for	flood	retreat	cultivation.	While	those	who	raise	large	numbers	of	goats	(e.g.,	the	Inkoria)	tend	
to	sell	their	goats	to	buy	food,	those	who	raise	cattle	have	to	grow	their	own	food	because	selling	
cattle	to	buy	food	is	less	common	in	Dassanech.
The	Dassanech	 are	 surrounded	 by	 four	 ethnic	 groups	 (namely,	 the	Turkana,	 the	Gabra,	 the	
Nyangatom,	and	the	Hamar),	who	are	considered	as	enemies	(kiz)	because	of	a	long	history	of	
conflict.2 The	Turkana	and	the	Gabra	are	located	in	Kenya,	while	the	Nyangatom	and	the	Hamar	
are	Ethiopians.	As	 indicated	earlier,	 the	conflict	between	the	Dassanech	and	their	neighbors	
may	be	explained	largely	in	terms	of	pasture	and	water	scarcity	and	certain	cultural	factors.	The	
alleged	involvement	of	external	agencies	(e.g.,	commercial	raiders	and	elements	of	the	Kenyan	
security	force)	seems	to	be	changing	the	dynamics	of	cross-border	conflict.3	Local	communities,	
1	 	A	small	group	of	Dassanech	called	Dhies	(part	of	the	Riele	territorial	section)	lives	around	the	nort-
hern	shore	of	Lake	Turkana	and	largely	depends	on	fishing.
2	 	Although	they	do	not	share	physical	borders,	the	Arbore,	the	Kara,	the	Somali,	the	Toposa	in	Southern	
Sudan,	and	the	Pokot	in	Kenya	are	called	gaal	kunno	(‘our	people’)	and	treated	as	fellow	associates.	
3	 	Since	cross-border	conflict	is	not	the	focus	of	the	present	research,	the	issue	will	not	be	covered	in	
detail.
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local	and	regional	governments,	and	NGOs	operating	in	the	area	have	been	organizing	repeated	
peace	meetings.	Despite	these	efforts,	the	conflict	between	the	Dassanech	and	their	neighbors	
continue	to	escalate.	
The	Dassanech	have	been	studied	by	many	researchers	such	as	Uri	Almagor	(1978,	1979,	1983,	
1986)	on	affinity	and	bond	partnership,	the	generation-set	system	and	confrontations,	and	the	
center-periphery	relations;	Claudia	Carr	(1977)	on	crisis	in	pastoralism;	Neal	Sobania	(1994)	on	
center-periphery	 relations;	Peggy	Elfman	 (2005)	on	women	and	 their	parts	 in	 society;	Yvuan	
Houtteman	(2007,	2010)	on	concepts	of	illness,	healing,	and	homicide;	Toru	Sagawa	(2008,	2009,	
2010)	on	peace	and	war,	automatic	rifles,	social	order	and	inter-ethnic	relations;	Yohannes	Ge-
bre-Michael	and	others	(2005)	on	conflict;	and	Yntiso	Gebre	(2011)	on	inter-ethnic	conflicts	and	
customary	conflict	resolution	mechanisms.	None	of	the	studies	conducted	thus	far	seriously	
explored	the	connection	between	environmental	change,	food	insecurity,	and	conflict.
The	present	research	was	undertaken	between	1	 June	and	23	 July	2011	 in	 two	 trips	 to	South	
Omo	Zone.	During	the	first	trip	that	lasted	until	11	June,	relevant	documents	from	zonal	offices	
were	obtained;	five	zonal	level	government	officials	and	experts	were	interviewed.	During	the	
second	trip	(10	to	22	July	2011),	seven	woreda	level	officials	and	experts	and	13	Dassanech	pasto-
ralists	from	three	villages	(Hadho,	Koro,	and	Rate)	were	interviewed.4	Moreover,	five	focus	group	
discussions	were	held	with	the	elderly	men	(two	groups),	adult	women,	a	mixture	of	men	and	
women,	and	the	youth.	Additionally,	different	literature	sources	(e.g.,	ethnographic	accounts),	
official	documents	(e.g.,	unpublished	reports),	and	statistical	records	(e.g.,	 livestock	size)	have	
been	 reviewed	 and	 incorporated	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 report	 as	 deemed	necessary.	Data	
acquired	during	a	previous	research	on	pastoral	conflict	and	conflict	resolution	mechanisms	
conducted	in	2009/10	have	also	been	used	in	this	report.
The	report	is	organized	into	five	sections.	This	introductory	section	is	followed	by	a	discussion	
on	the	state	of	local	conflict	in	the	study	area.	In	this	section	attempts	are	made	to	describe	the	
types	of	conflict,	the	major	actors,	and	the	trends	in	the	conflict	dynamics.	Section	three	focuses	
on	the	relationship	between	food	insecurity	and	conflict.	More	specifically,	this	section	touches	
on	perceptions	about	and	reasons	for	food	insecurity,	the	link	between	production	short-fall	
and	conflict,	and	the	implication	of	dependency	on	food	aid	for	conflict.	The	fourth	section	is	
devoted	to	the	presentation	of	conflict	resolution	mechanisms,	especially	the	institutions,	ac-
tors,	and	levels	involved.	The	conclusion	represents	the	last	section	of	the	report.	
4	 	The	Koro	live	close	to	the	Dassanech-Turkana	border,	the	Hado	close	to	the	Dassanech-Gabra	and	
Dassanech-Hamar	border,	and	Rate	inhabit	the	border	between	Dassanech	and	the	Nyangatom.	The	
three	 specific	 research	 sites,	 located	 far	 apart,	were	 selected	 to	 understand	 the	 dynamics	 of	 inter-
ethnic	conflict	from	different	places.
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2. Local Conflicts in Dassanech
2.1 Intra-ethnic conflicts
The	most	common	and	serious	disputes	within	Dassanech	society	are	related	to	women	and	
livestock.	Disputes	related	to	women	are	caused	by	acts	of	adultery,	taking	a	married	woman	as	
a	wife/lover,	causing	pre-marital	pregnancy,	rape,	forced	marriage	(bride-capture),	and	failure	
to	complete	bride-wealth	payment.	Sometimes	some	individuals/families	are	agitated	to	force-
fully	take	the	livestock	of	others	when	the	latter	fail	to	fulfill	their	duties,	such	as	completing	
the	payment	of	bride-wealth,	servicing	debt,	or	 taking	responsibility	 for	any	wrongdoing.	 In	
addition,	theft	and	other	forms	of	misconduct	may	lead	to	inter-personal	and/or	inter-family	
conflicts.	
How	about	 intra-ethnic	 conflict	over	 land	and	water?	The	 culture	of	 sharing	 (including	 the	
sharing	of	land	and	water)	represents	part	of	the	survival	strategy	of	the	Dassanech	pastoralists.	
The	spatial	and	temporal	variability	of	these	vital	resources	necessitated	interdependence	and	
cooperation	rather	than	conflict	over	such	resources.	Although	territorial	sections	are	believed	
to	control	certain	geographic	locations,	access	to	pasture	and	water	has	always	been	open	to	
guests	 from	other	Dassanech	sections	 that	 are	expected	only	 to	acknowledge	 the	occupancy	
rights	of	the	hosts.	This	has	been	the	norm	rather	than	the	exception	and	still	is	today.	Das-
sanech	herders	are	reported	to	engage	in	arguments	and	sometimes	physical	fights	over	the	
arrangement	and	prioritization	of	resource	use.	Traditionally,	according	to	 informants,	such	
low	profile	disputes	were	never	meant	to	deny	access	to	resources	and	never	led	to	killings.	
In	recent	years,	however,	resource	scarcity	caused	deadly	intra-ethnic	conflicts	over	pastureland.	
In	1987,	 two	Dassanech	groups	from	the	same	territorial	section	 (Shiir)	clashed	over	grazing	
land	in	a	place	called	Qorobilil	(around	the	northern	shore	of	Lake	Turkana)	and	two	herders	
were	killed.	Second,	in	1989,	two	other	groups	fought	over	pastureland	in	Lokdinya	(around	the	
same	lakeshore)	and	exchanged	gunfire.	A	third	incident	that	led	to	the	death	of	one	herder	is	
reported	to	have	occurred	near	Neberemus	area	in	the	last	five	years	(informants	do	not	remem-
ber	the	exact	date).	Fourth,	the	Narich	people	in	Hadho	area	reported	to	have	experienced	ar-
med	confrontation	with	their	hosts	(fellow	Dassanech)	over	the	use	of	grazing	land	and	water	
in	the	lakeshore.	The	elders	from	the	host	group	intervened	to	prevent	bloodshed	and	ensured	
that	the	guests	had	access	to	the	resources	as	usual.	
Taking	the	life	of	a	fellow	Dassanech	is	nyogich (crude	equivalent	of	sin	or	pollution)	and	the	
killer	gets	polluted	or	becomes	 ritually	 impure.	Killing	 another	Dassanech	 in	 revenge	 for	 a	
previous	killing	or	even	socially	interacting	with	a	killer	is	also	considered	as	polluting	oneself.	
Many	Dassanech	seem	to	be	in	a	state	of	disbelief	that	nowadays	they	are	killing	each	other	over	
land	and	water	that	they	should	be	sharing.	An	eldzzerly	man	remarked:
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“A	Dassanech	does	not	kill	another	Dassanech	because	it	is	nyogich	 […]	When	we	quarrel,	
sometimes	we	fight	with	sticks.	Killing	your	own	people	even	by	mistake	would	cause	the	
swelling	 of	 the	 belly	 and	death.	 People	who	killed	 other	Dassanech	 live	 in	 the	 bush	on	
their	own.	They	are	not	allowed	to	live	and	interact	with	other	people	before	undergoing	
cleansing	rituals	[…]	You	do	not	kill	someone	who	killed	your	family	member	in	revenge,	as	
that	is	like	committing	a	double	nyogich.”	(Koro,	18	July	2011)
The	Dassanech	have	customary	dispute	resolution	mechanisms	to	address	 intra-ethnic	con-
flicts.	Whenever	possible,	disputes	between	individuals	or	families	are	resolved	at	the	family,	
age-set,	or	neighborhood	level	with	the	help	of	somebody	who	has	mediation	skills.	Cases	that	
cannot	be	managed	at	these	levels	are	reported	to	the	arra	–	the	traditional	council	of	judges	
found	in	every	major	Dassanech	village.	The	Dassanech	rarely	report	intra-ethnic	conflicts	to	
the	formal	law	enforcement	agencies	such	as	the	police	or	the	court.	This	is	confirmed	by	the	
Dassanech	informants	in	the	study	villages	and	authorities	of	the	district	court	and	the	police	
department	located	in	Omorate	town.	
2.2 Inter-ethnic conflicts
As	noted	in	the	introduction,	the	Dassanech	are	surrounded	by	four	ethnic	groups	whom	they	
consider	as	enemies,	due	to	a	history	of	conflict	largely	over	grazing	land	and	water.	In	the	past,	
from	the	Dassanech	perspective,	conflicts	occurred	intermittently	and	reconciliation	lasted	for	
several	years.	Since	recent	years,	according	to	informants,	the	frequency	and	intensity	of	con-
flicts	increased	and	peace	initiatives	repeatedly	failed.	This	section	presents	the	historical	and	
current	state	of	conflicts	between	the	Dassanech	and	their	four	neighbors.
2.2.1 Dassanech vs. Hamar
The	Dassanech	and	the	Hamar	had	times	of	peace	and	trust	as	well	as	times	of	conflict.	Accor-
ding	to	the	perspectives	of	Dassanech	informants,	their	Hamar	neighbors	lived	in	a	place	called	
Asho	and	Mount	Goromsa	was	the	border	between	the	two	groups.	It	appears	that	some	150	
years	ago,	the	Dassanech	and	the	Hamar	lived	in	peace	and	used	to	visit	each	other	and	share	
grazing	land	and	water	points.	An	elderly	man	noted:
“We	used	to	 invite	 them	[the	Hamar]	 from	their	homeland	in	Asho.	Our	animals	grazed	
together.	Conflict	started	during	my	grandfather’s	 time,	 it	 intensified	during	my	father’s	
days,	and	got	worse	today.	Over	the	years,	the	Hamar	kicked	us	out	of	such	border	grazing	
areas	as	Zersia,	Dhibile,	Goromsa,	Dara,	Aymun,	Gerlanta,	Duf,	Loya,	Qadite,	Longia,	Nangay,	
and	Napay.5	Then,	we	retreated	to	Narema	area,	which	again	became	a	conflict	scene.”	(Hado,	
5	 	The	informant	was	assisted	by	other	people	sitting	around	in	listing	the	names.	He	stated	that	Dhible	
and	Gerlanta	are	taken	by	the	Hamar.	Later	on,	it	became	evident	that	the	Dassanech	use	these	two	
places	when	they	are	in	peace	with	the	Hamar.	
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At	the	present,	the	resource-related	conflicts	arise	over	the	use	of	such	grazing	areas	as	Surge,	
Elzante,	Gerlem,	Fejej,	Narema,	Matachew,	Dhibile,	and	Gerlanta.	During	peace	time,	the	two	
groups	share	the	resources	and	when	conflict	arises,	they	either	abandon	the	respective	area	or	
continue	to	use	it	with	caution	and	worries.	The	Dassanech	abandoned	places	like	Karberet,	
Elgente,	Markulte	(Kizo),	and	Dongia	due	to	the	drying	up	of	permanent	water	points.
 
The	main	 sources	 of	 conflict	 between	 the	Dassanech	 and	Hamar	 include	 competition	 over	
pasture	 and	water	 points,	 livestock	 raid/theft,	 and	killings	 for	 retaliation	or	honor.	Conflict	
between	the	two	groups	often	occurs	along	their	common	border	where	pasture	and	water	are	
available.	Drought	and	resource	depletion	is	increasingly	forcing	the	Dassanech	and	the	Hamar	
to	maintain	control	over	available	resources.	Many	Dassanech	villagers	displaced	by	the	Tur-
kana	from	the	western	side	of	the	Omo	River	took	refuge	with	their	fellow	Dassanech	on	the	
eastern	side	of	the	river	(in	the	direction	of	the	Hamar	territory).	Due	to	the	steady	growth	of	
human	and	animal	populations,	the	carrying	capacity	of	Dassanechland	dwindled.	Informants	
indicated	that	due	to	the	depletion	of	grazing	areas,	they	have	been	forced	to	take	their	cattle	to	
risky	border	places.	The	Hamar	have	also	been	advancing	southward	to	exploit	pasture	and	wa-
ter	in	the	border	areas.	Livestock	raids/thefts	and	homicides	intensify	whenever	the	two	groups	
converge	in	the	same	area.
	According	to	the	Dassanech	woreda	police	department,	between	September	2009	and	July	2010,	
the	Hamar	attacked	the	Dassanech	twelve	times,	killed	eight	people,	injured	two	others,	and	rai-
ded	an	unknown	number	of	livestock.	The	study	revealed	(though	detailed	records	are	lacking)	
that	the	Dassanech	have	also	been	involved	in	offensive	actions	(in	retribution	or	otherwise)	
that	led	to	loss	of	lives	and	property	in	Hamar.	Further	research	is	needed	to	understand	the	
Hamar	side	of	the	story.
2.2.2 Dassanech vs. Nyangatom
The	Dassanech	and	the	Nyangatom	ethnic	groups	had	been	under	one	administration	for	a	
long	time	(first	as	Geleb	woreda and	later	as	Kuraz woreda).	In	2006,	Kuraz woreda	was	split	into	
Dassanech	and	Nyangatom	woredas	as	part	of	the	restructuring	of	certain	districts	in	different	
parts	 of	 Ethiopia	 based	 on	 population	 size,	 logistic	 factors,	 and	 justified	 local	 demands	 for	
district	status.	According	to	informants	and	historical	records	(Tsega-Ab	2005),	the	two	ethnic	
groups	had	amicable	co-existence	and	cooperation	during	the	reign	of	Emperor	Menelik.	The	
historically	cooperative	relationship	and	peaceful	co-existence	gave	way	to	animosity	later	in	
time.	The	first	 serious	 conflict	 is	 reported	 to	have	occurred	around	1950	when	a	Dassanech	
herder	killed	an	elderly	Nyangatom	woman	in	Nakwa	(or	Kibish),	where	the	two	groups	lived	
together	(Sagawa	2010).	In	the	late	1970s,	sporadic	conflict	between	the	two	groups	culminated	
in	a	major	war	at	Lophitar	around	Kibish	when	the	Dassanech	attacked	the	Nyangatom.	Soon	
after,	the	Nyangatom	launched	a	retaliatory	attack	on	Kelem	area	in	Dassanech.	After	the	Kelem	
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war,	the	Dassanech	carried	out	an	assault	on	the	Nyangatom	at	Nawoyahafe	around	Kibesh	area.	
In	the	1970s,	the	Dassanech	had	an	advantage	over	the	Nyangatom,	partly	because	the	latter	had	
been	involved	in	battles	with	other	neighbors,	mainly	the	Kara	and	the	Hamar	(Sagawa	2010).	
In	the	1980s,	the	introduction	of	modern	arms,	such	as	AK-47	automatic	rifles	to	Nyangatom	
from	the	southern	Sudan	changed	the	balance	of	power,	and	the	Dassanech	became	the	first	
victims.	The	Nyangatom	obtained	weapons	from	the	Toposa	of	Sudan	during	the	Sudanese	civil	
war	that	increased	modern	arms	trade	in	the	region.	The	Toposa,	with	whom	the	Nyangatom	
share	 a	 common	 language	 and	 culture,	 had	not	 only	 supplied	weapons	 but	 also	 formed	 an	
alliance	with	the	Nyangatom	against	their	enemies.	In	the	late	1980s,	the	two	groups	attacked	
the	Dassanech	and	destroyed	three	villages.	The	most	violent	clash	was	the	one	that	took	place	
at	Selegn	village,	during	which	hundreds	of	Dassanech	are	reported	to	have	perished	in	a	few	
hours	(Sagawa	2010).	After	acquiring	modern	arms	in	the	early	1990s,	the	Dassanech	recovered	
from	the	devastating	crisis	and	tried	to	launch	attacks	on	the	Nyangatom	at	Nakwa.	Although	
no	large-scale	assaults	took	place	since	the	1990s	Nakwa	war,	the	Nyangatom-Dassanech	rela-
tions	remain	very	tense	to	date.	The	nature	of	the	conflict	has	changed	from	large-scale	armed	
conflict	and	raids	to	small-scale	ambushes	and	raids/thefts	by	small	groups,	and	this	has	po-
sed	a	tremendous	challenge	for	peace	efforts.	In	2010,	small	groups	of	Dassanech	perpetrators	
entered	the	Nyangatom	territory	six	times,	killed	four	people	and	injured	16	others;	in	the	same	
year,	the	Nyangatom	perpetrators	entered	the	Dassanech	territory	seven	times	and	killed	three	
people	and	injured	one	other	(Gebre	2011).
The	study	reveals	that	the	conflict	between	the	Nyangatom	and	the	Dassanech	increased	and	
the	multiple	peace	agreements	reached	with	the	help	of	woreda	officials	and	NGOs	failed.	The	
Dassanech-Nyangatom	conflicts	may	be	explained	in	terms	of	competition	over	land	and	water,	
the	strong	culture	of	retaliation	(revenge	killings	and	raids),	and	the	failure	to	attain	genuine	
reconciliation.6	As	the	result	of	the	conflict,	the	Dassanech	are	reported	to	have	lost	their	tra-
ditional	grazing	land	to	the	Nyangatom.	For	example,	the	Dassanech	informants	claimed	that	
the	Nyangatom	forced	them	out	of	their	traditional	pasturelands	such	as	Gima,	Hamite,	Kuraz,	
Lochober,	Loroqoy,	Loturtur,	and	Nakwa.	Moreover,	because	of	security	concerns	both	groups	
currently	do	not	use	the	resource	(pastures	and	water)	rich	Kare	and	Qorei	Abowole	areas	at	
their	common	border.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	Dassanech	abandoned	some	grazing	
land	(e.g.,	Borkonech)	due	to	drying	up	of	water	points.	As	a	result	of	all	this,	the	Dassanech	
living	on	the	Western	side	of	the	Omo	River	are	left	with	a	substantially	reduced	number	of	
grazing	areas	located	in	Kalam,	Toltale,	and	around	the	northern	shore	of	the	Lake	Turkana	(e.g.,	
Abalakua,	Korema,	Lokdinya,	Qes	el,	Qorobilil,	Tirte,	Yerle,	etc.).	The	lakeshore	pastureland	is	
the	last	resort	and	the	most	reliable	source	of	grass	and	water	for	the	Dassanech,	who	depend	
heavily	on	cattle	raising.
6	 	Conflict	used	to	erupt	due	to	the	failure	of	one	party	to	implement	decisions	made	during	peace	in-
itiatives.	When	one	party	fails	to	return	raided/stolen	animals	and/or	to	bring	criminals	to	justice,	the	
other	party	is	agitated	to	take	revenge.
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2.2.3 Dassanech vs. Turkana 
The	Dassanech	lost	their	traditional	pastureland	to	the	Turkana	pastoralists	since	the	coloni-
al	period	(see	also	Almagor	1979,	1986).	Nene	Mburu	(2003)	reported	that	the	British	colonial	
government	controlled	 livestock	herding	by	 local	pastoralists	around	the	border	area	of	Ke-
nya,	Sudan,	and	Ethiopia	thereby	increasing	competition	for	scarce	pastures	between	pastoral	
peoples.	These	policies	caused	an	intensification	of	hostility	between	the	Dassanech	and	the	
neighboring	 communities,	 particularly	 the	Turkana	 and	Gabra	 in	Kenya	 (Sagawa	 2010).	The	
longstanding	conflict	between	the	Dassanech	and	the	Turkana	further	escalated	in	recent	years.	
Fragmented	reports	from	Dassanech	Woreda	Police	Department	reveal	that	between	November	
2008	and	October	2010,	the	Turkana	attacked	the	Dassanech	24	times	during	which	the	former	
killed	19	people,	injured	nine	others,	and	raided	3,423	goats	and	six	donkeys.
On	the	whole,	the	root	causes	of	the	conflict	between	the	Dassanech	and	the	Turkana	include	
land	alienation,	frequent	livestock	raids,	water	claims	for	fishing,	theft	of	fishing	nets,	and	kill-
ing	of	herders	and	other	people.	Since	the	colonial	period,	the	Dassanech	lost	control	over	the	
rich	pasture	in	Berbere,	Ilam,	Herum,	Lomodhan,	Lumiyana,	Narwot,	and	Neswat	(Todonyang)	
–	all	currently	under	Turkana	control.	Moreover,	 the	remaining	grazing	 lands	 in	 the	border	
areas	such	as	Loqongole	and	Natade	have	often	been	abandoned	due	to	security	concerns.	The	
Dassanech	informants	underlined	that	the	cross-border	conflict	has	taken	a	new	form	in	that	
the	fighters/raiders	coming	from	the	Turkana	side	are	highly	sophisticated	and	allegedly	sup-
ported	by	certain	interest	groups	such	as	livestock	traders,	corrupt	officials,	and	elements	of	
the	Kenyan	General	Service	Unit.	The	sophistication	of	 the	Turkana	fighters	 is	explained	 in	
relation	to	use	of	vehicles,	better	weapons	(e.g.,	G3),	communication	equipments,	helmets,	etc.	
Raided	animals	are	often	immediately	sold	or	shared	among	different	people	and	dispersed,	
which	makes	retrieval	rather	difficult.	
2.2.4 Dassanech vs. Gabra 
The	Gabra	of	Kenya	who	share	a	border	with	the	Dassanech	are	predominantly	pastoralists.	
The	Inkoria,	one	of	the	eight	territorial	sections	of	the	Dassanech,	live	in	close	proximity	with	
the	Gabra.	The	historical	relationship	between	the	Dassanech	and	the	Gabra	is	characterized	
by	both	conflict	and	peaceful	co-existence.	The	Dassanech	remember	certain	landmarks	that	
shaped	the	nature	of	their	relationship	with	the	Gabra.	The	so-called	Illeret	massacre	of	several	
Dassanech	boys	during	their	circumcision	seclusion	remained	vivid	in	the	memories	of	many	
people.	The	Dassanech	culture	provides	that	during	seclusion	periods,	newly	circumcised	boys	
should	not	touch	weapons.	Therefore,	the	victims	of	the	Illeret	massacre	were	unarmed	easy	
prey	for	the	Gabra	attackers.	The	second	incident	that	poisoned	the	relationship	between	the	
two	neighboring	groups	was	the	assassination	of	a	prominent	Gabra	leader	by	a	Dassanech	man	
during	a	peace	meeting	at	Ilolo,	near	Illeret.	After	this	incident,	the	Gabra	mounted	repeated	
attacks	on	the	Dassanech	to	revenge	for	their	leader’s	death.	The	third	major	incident	was	a	
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large-scale	attack	the	Dassanech	launched	on	the	Gabra	and	the	nearby	Kenyan	security	force	
during	which	many	Gabra	perished.	
The	major	causes	of	conflict	between	the	Dassanech	and	the	Gabra	are	land	claims,	livestock	
raiding,	and	individualized	killings.	The	Dassanech	on	the	Gabra	side,	in	defiance	of	the	inter-
national	boundary	that	divides	their	ancestral	homeland	into	Ethiopian	and	Kenyan	territories,	
continue	to	use	their	traditional	grazing	lands	located	up	to	200	km	deep	inside	the	legal	ter-
ritory	of	Kenya.	The	Gabra	are	opposed	to	the	fact	that	the	Dassanech	continue	to	enjoy	access	
to	grazing	land	in	Kenyan	territory.	Most	of	the	small-scale	conflicts	between	the	two	groups	
took	place	in	such	places	as	Naibar	and	Asuma	on	the	Kenya	territory.	Sometimes,	however,	the	
Gabra	perpetrated	attacks	on	Ethiopian	soil.	In	November	2009,	for	example,	they	raided	675	
goats	and	ten	cattle	from	a	place	called	Kokei	in	a	border	kebele	known	as	Bubua.	Inter-ethnic	
raids/thefts	of	livestock	to	meet	social	and	economic	desires	seem	to	be	common	between	the	
two	groups.	Members	of	the	Dassanech	and	the	Gabra	ethnic	groups	kill	members	of	ethnic	
groups	considered	enemies	for	honor	and	status	change.	
2.3 Major actors in conflict
2.3.1 The youth
The	youth	are	at	the	center	of	pastoral	conflicts	because	they	are	the	ones	to	commit	offensive	
and/or	defensive	actions.	The	youth	are	brought	up	in	an	environment	that	provides	the	social	
ingredients	to	become	fearless,	courageous,	and	heroic.	The	social	environment	also	generates	
competition	and	rivalry.	The	youth	in	each	territorial	section	are	responsible	for	the	protec-
tion	of	territorial	borders	and	revenge	against	external	offenders.	Success	in	offensive	and/or	
defensive	action	is	attached	only	to	the	generation-sets	or	age-sets	involved	rather	than	to	the	
entire	group.	This	places	pressure	on	generation-sets	and	age-sets	to	leave	an	impressive	mark	
behind.	Those	who	have	killed	members	of	an	enemy	ethnic	group	and	raided	animals	from	
such	groups	are	praised.	It	 is	not	uncommon	to	observe	unconstrained,	uncoordinated,	and	
independent	actions	by	small	groups,	which	may	have	devastating	consequences	for	the	larger	
community.	The	greatest	worry	of	many	elders	is	that	the	reckless	behavior	of	youngsters	pro-
vokes	unexpected	counterattacks.	Hence,	the	tradition	requires	that	the	fighters	get	permission	
and	blessing	from	their	izam (fathers	in	the	age-system)	and	rituals	performed	by	the	relevant	
clans	before	they	engage	in	offensive/defensive	acts.	
However,	 there	 are	moments	when	certain	 youths	 take	 action	without	 securing	permission.	
Based	on	such	incidences,	some	informants	felt	that	the	power	of	elders	has	been	eroded,	while	
others	noted	that	the	youngsters	still	respect	the	authority	of	elders.	It	appears	that	when	the	
frequency	of	attacks	and	counter-attacks	increases,	the	degree	of	tolerance	on	the	part	of	the	
elders	also	changes.	The	elders	are	aware	of	the	fact	that	youth	action	or	inaction	may	lead	to	
unpredictable	consequences.	Given	the	volatile	nature	of	the	area	and	in	the	face	of	repeated	
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enemy	attacks,	it	would	be	naïve	for	them	to	preach	peace	and	curse	war.	In	the	best	interest	
of	their	society,	they	make	a	delicate	balance	between	restraining	the	youth	to	attain	peace	and	
approving	their	aggressive	stance	to	maximize	deterrence.	
The	behavior	and	action	of	the	youth	are	the	results	of	a	number	of	factors	rather	than	a	func-
tion	of	elders	control	alone.	Senior	age-sets	within	the	same	generation-set	and	peers	or	age-
mates	within	the	same	age-set	could	motivate,	constrain,	and	discipline	the	behaviors	of	fellow	
youngsters.	Also,	women	are	reported	 to	play	a	key	role	 in	 inciting	violence	 through	acts	or	
behavior	that	would	humiliate	the	cowardly	and	reward	the	brave.	
2.3.2 Senior generation-set
Apart	from	their	division	into	territorial	sections	and	clans,	the	Dassanech	people	have	an	age	
system	that	divides	people	into	generation-sets	and	age-groups.	A	particular	generation-set	in	
power	is	led	by	the	council	of	arra	that	consists	of	challeba	(the	ultimate	decision-makers),	nemo	
(advisors	and	coordinators)	and	tolol	(implementers,	foot-soldiers).	The	arra	plays	a	crucial	role	
in	initiating	or	resolving	major	conflicts.	The	youth	cannot	engage	in	any	major	assault	against	
another	group	without	the	knowledge,	permission,	and	blessing	of	these	highly	respected	and	
feared	elderly.	Moreover,	it	is	the	elderly	who	participate	in	reconciliation	representing	their	
territorial	section	or	the	entire	ethnic	group.	The	management	of	inter-ethnic	disputes	by	el-
ders	can	encompass	violent	actions	and/or	peaceful	solutions.	Regarding	violent	action,	accor-
ding	to	 the	 informants,	 four	types	of	offensive/defensive	responses	may	be	 identified:	 large-
scale,	small-scale,	emergency,	and	unauthorized.	Large-scale	action	is	organized	when	an	ethnic	
group	suffers	a	major	loss	of	life	and/or	livestock	in	the	hands	of	its	enemy.	After	holding	public	
meetings,	the	need	for	retribution	at	the	appropriate	time	is	decided	by	the	senior	generation-
sets	in	consultation	with	the	relevant	parties,	such	as	the	junior	office	holders,	wise/influential	
individuals,	 the	youngsters,	and	the	ritual	specialists.	When	the	appropriate	time	comes,	 the	
warriors	are	blessed	and	seen	off	in	a	ritualized	ceremony.	
A	small-scale	offense	is	organized	by	a	territorial	section	to	take	revenge	for	a	small	attack	or	
raid	it	suffered	in	the	recent	or	remote	past.	The	participation	of	the	senior	generation-set	and	
other	relevant	parties	within	the	specific	section	would	suffice	to	give	permission	and	bless	the	
fighters	in	a	low-key	ceremony.	Emergency	offense	takes	place	when	certain	age-sets	or	fami-
ly	members	decide	to	conduct	hot-pursuit	immediately	after	an	enemy	attack	or	raid	with	or	
without	permission	and	blessing	from	the	elders.	The	intention	could	be	to	take	revenge	or	to	
track	raided	animals	and	get	them	back.	The	above	three	forms	of	actions	are	considered	justi-
fied	and	approved	by	the	senior	generation-set.	
When	youngsters	realize	that	the	elders	are	unlikely	to	grant	permission,	they	tend	to	go	for	
unauthorized	offense.	The	elders,	who	generally	favor	peace	over	war,	seriously	disapprove	pro-
vocative	actions.	Depending	on	the	gravity	of	the	action,	they	may	order	the	whipping	of	the	
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perpetrators,	return	raided	animals	to	the	owners,	and/or	send	a	word	of	apology	to	the	group	
that	was	being	attacked.	In	July	2011,	several	youngsters	who	were	planning/preparing	to	take	
revenge	against	the	Hamar	without	the	permission	of	the	elders	were	caught	and	whipped	in	
the	nab	(open	meeting	place)	on	the	orders	of	the	challeba.	
The	elders	also	make	decisions	to	resolve	disputes	peacefully.	After	major	conflicts	or	a	series	
of	repeated	small	clashes,	elders	would	express	 the	need	to	 initiate	a	peace	process	 through	
peace	messengers,	who	would	carry	white	ostrich	feathers	tied	to	a	tree	branch	as	a	peace	sym-
bol.	When	the	other	party	agrees	to	resolve	the	conflict	peacefully,	the	elders	would	organize	
internal	meetings	to	discuss	about	the	reconciliation.	Then	delegates	(senior,	wise,	experienced,	
and	articulate	elders)	would	be	identified	to	attend	the	peace	negotiations	and	deliberations.	
Such	meetings	almost	always	end	with	agreement	and	ritual	performances	(by	elders)	such	as	
splashing	milk	and	water	on	participants,	placing	the	belly	fat	of	a	sacrificial	goat	on	their	neck,	
rubbing	hands/body	with	stomach	discharges,	holding	fresh	green	grass/leaves,	breaking	and	
burying	spears	or	guns,	cursing	evil	deeds,	and	blessing	peaceful	activities.	
2.3.3 Women
The	male	youths	in	Dassanech	are	brought	up	in	a	social	environment	that	encourages	fearless-
ness,	selflessness,	heroism,	and	sacrifice	for	honor.	Women,	especially	girls,	are	reported	to	be	
playing	a	significant	role	in	triggering	anger	and	driving	men	into	violence.	They	tend	to	chal-
lenge	docility	through	nagging	and	ridiculing	directly,	for	example	by	questioning	the	man-
liness	of	a	particular	person	or	age-set	or	indirectly	by	expressing	their	utter	defenselessness	
despite	 the	 presence	 of	 boys/men	 in	 the	 community.	Moreover,	women/girls	 praise	 aggres-
siveness	through	emotional	yelling,	singing,	and	gift	giving	when	the	men	return	home	with	
victory	in	killing	and/or	raids	(Houtteman	2010:	140).	While	bringing	a	sense	of	ultimate	pride	
and	heroism	to	those	who	emerged	victorious,	such	acts	are	reported	to	motivate	many	others	
to	follow	suit	in	pursuit	of	similar	treatment.	A	woman	explained	how	she	nagged	her	husband	
over	night	to	take	revenge	against	the	Turkana,	who	killed	their	son	and	stole	their	cattle:
“One	morning,	my	husband	hassled	my	son	to	look	after	the	cattle	heading	to	the	grazing	
field.	My	son	did	not	even	finish	the	food	I	gave	him.	[…]	He	did	not	come	back.	He	was	
killed	 by	 the	Turkana,	who	 also	 stole	 the	 cows	 […]	At	 night,	 I	 cried	 […]	 the	 calves	were	
mooing	because	their	mothers	were	taken.	I	said	to	my	husband,	‘What	are	you	going	to	do	
about	our	son,	who	did	not	return	to	finish	his	food?	[…]	What	are	you	going	to	do	about	
the	calves	mooing	all	night?’	My	husband	started	to	sigh	and	sing	war	songs	and	left	early	in	
the	morning	with	his	friends	to	take	revenge	[…]	The	next	day,	they	returned	home	singing	
victory	songs.	I	felt	vindicated.”	(Koro,	16	July	2011)
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2.3.4 Diviners/magicians
Certain	clans	are	believed	to	have	power	over	certain	natural	phenomena	such	as	drought,	di-
seases	and	social	events	such	as	war	and	raids.	For	example,	the	Galbur	are	believed	to	handle	
water	and	crocodiles,	and	the	Turat	to	heal	fire	burns.	Likewise,	the	Turinyerim	are	believed	to	
cure	snakebites	and	make	rain	at	times	of	drought,	and	the	Fargar	to	heal	animal	disease	and	
avoid	flies.	Moreover,	the	Turinyerim	and	the	Fargar	are	believed	to	have	divine	and/or	magical	
power	to	ensure	victory	over	enemies	during	war	and/or	raids.	Hence,	members	of	the	two	clans	
are	asked	to	perform	certain	pre-offense	rituals,	and	they	accompany	or	lead	the	fighters	all	the	
way	to	the	enemy	land.	Different	types	and	levels	of	ritual	continue	when	the	fighters	return	
home	after	killing	enemies	and/or	raiding	animals.	All	informants	interviewed	believed	in	the	
power	of	the	clan	diviners.	
2.3.5 Government institutions 
At	the	district	level,	the	formal	government	institutions	with	jurisdiction	over	security	and	law-
enforcement	matters	are	the woreda administration,	the	police,	and	the	court.	Since	almost	all	
intra-ethnic	disputes	are	resolved	through	customary	dispute	resolution	mechanisms	(at	family,	
neighborhood,	and	arra	levels),	the	formal	law-enforcement	institutions	play	a	very	limited	role.	
However,	external	attacks	are	brought	to	the	attention	of	the	police	and	the	administration.	The	
police	force	in	Dassanech	is	inadequately	staffed	and	equipped	to	monitor	the	border	areas	and	
prevent	inter-ethnic	conflict.	Due	to	logistical	constraints,	incident	reports	reach	police	posts	
often	long	after	the	event,	which	makes	it	difficult	for	the	police	to	take	action.	Until	recently,	
there	had	been	only	two	police	posts	(at	Neberemus	and	Bubua)	near	the	Ethio-Kenyan	border.	
With	the	objective	to	enhance	community	policing,	new	police	posts	have	been	established	at	
Selegn,	Toltale,	Sirimiriet,	Hadho,	and	Ocholoch.	The	construction	of	a	new	police	post	at	Nare-
ma	 (Dassanech-Hamar	border)	 is	underway.	These	are	 some	of	 the	areas	where	 inter-ethnic	
clashes	have	occurred.	The	establishment	of	some	of	the	new	police	posts	is	reported	to	have	
encouraged	some	Dassanech	pastoralists	to	return	to	villages	that	they	had	abandoned	due	to	
security	concerns.	However,	according	to	informants,	the	officers	assigned	in	each	post	are	few	
in	number	and	lack	many	resources	to	deter	Turkana	and	Gabra	attacks.
2.3.6 CEWARN and NGOs
In	the	context	of	conflict	in	Dassanech	area,	the	role	of	many	NGOs	has	been	that	of	supporting	
peace	initiatives	(e.g.,	peace	meetings/festivals)	and	capacity	building	of	peace	committees.	In	
addition	to	supporting	the	local	peace	initiatives	(especially	in	sponsoring	peace	accords),	the	
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intergovernmental	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism	 (CEWARN)	undertakes	early	
warning	works	through	its	field	reporters,	receives	and	keeps	incident	reports,	and	facilitates	
bilateral	communication	and	border	commission	meetings	on	inter-ethnic	conflict.	The	major	
NGOs	that	used	to	operate	in	Dassanech	include	Mary	Corps,	the	Ethiopian Pastoralist Research 
and Development Association (EPaRDA),	Pact	Ethiopia,	and	the	Atowokis Ekisil Pastoralist Develop-
ment Association	(AEPDA).	During	the	research	time,	all	but	AEPDA	had	terminated	operation	in	
the	area.	Regarding	the	role	played	by	NGOs,	the	locals	have	mixed	reactions.	Some	informants	
underlined	that	some	three	years	ago,	there	was	relative	peace	in	Dassanech	due	to	the	active	
involvement	of	NGOs	in	supporting	peace	initiatives.	
For	example,	the	role	played	by	EPaRDA	in	terms	of	establishing	and	activating	the	local	peace	
committees	is	believed	to	have	led	to	relative	peace	and	stability	at	the	time	of	the	project	op-
eration.	The	recent	escalation	of	conflict	coincided	with	the	end	of	NGO	activities	in	the	area.	
The	enactment	of	the	charities	and	societies	proclamation	in	Ethiopia	(Negarit	Gazeta	2009)	
significantly	restricted	the	participation	of	civil	society	organizations	or	NGOs	in	certain	areas	
including	 conflict.	Hence,	 some	NGOs	 (e.g.,	 EPaRDA)	 abandoned	 their	mandate	 to	work	on	
conflict,	while	others	(e.g.,	AEPDA)	seem	to	be	operating	under	limited	space,	increased	scru-
tiny,	and	unclear	terrain	due	to	lack	of	clear	guidelines.7
In	July	2011,	 the	peace	committees	were	not	active	as	evidenced	by	the	termination	of	regu-
lar	community	peace	meetings	and	the	absence	of	refreshment	training.	It	appears	that	some	
NGOs	withdrew	before	the	beneficiaries	were	ready	to	take	over	and	run	the	projects	on	their	
own.	Apart	from	complaints	on	the	issue	of	sustainability,	informants	expressed	discomfort	by	
the	way	the	NGOs	and	woreda officials	hassled	some	elders	to	attend	hastily	organized	peace	
meetings	without	adequate	preparation.	In	such	meetings,	the	participants	felt	pressurized	by	
the	organizers	to	accept	deals	that	they	would	otherwise	reject.	
2.4 Recent changes in conflict trends
Changes	 in	 the	conflict	dynamics	 in	Dassanech	area	have	been	observed.	These	changes	are	
manifested	through	the	onset	of	intra-ethnic	conflict	over	resources,	rise	in	the	frequency	of	
conflict	occurrence,	alleged	involvement	of	elements	of	the	Kenyan	security	force,	and	an	alle-
ged	commercial	interest	behind	raids.	First,	though	very	limited	in	scale	and	occurrence,	deadly	
intra-ethnic	conflicts	over	access	to	land/water	took	place	in	the	last	six	years	for	the	first	time	
7	 	The	Ethiopian	Charities	and	Societies	Proclamation	N0.	621/2009	recognizes	three	major	categories	
of	civil	society	organizations:	Ethiopian	charities	and	societies	(ECS),	Ethiopian	resident	charities	and	
societies	(ERCS),	and	foreign	charities	(FC).	The	ECS,	that	can	engage	in	all	areas	of	civil	society	in-
terventions	including	governance	and	human	rights,	are	allowed	to	receive	not	more	than	10	percent	
of	their	funds	from	foreign	sources.	The	ERCS	could	receive	up	to	90	percent	of	their	revenues	from	
foreign	countries.	The	foreign	charities	could	receive	any	amount	that	they	could	secure.	However,	the	
ERCS	and	FC	are	barred	from	working	on	rights	issues	(governance,	human	rights,	etc.)	using	funds	
from	foreign	sources.	
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in	the	history	of	the	Dassanech.	Traditionally,	disputes	between	herders	over	the	arrangement	
of	resource	use	(i.e.,	turn-taking	or	prioritization)	were	resolved	through	negotiation	or	phy-
sical	fights	with	sticks	rather	than	with	firearms.	The	idea	of	denying	access	to	vital	resources	
to	fellow	Dassanech	and	killing	each	other	for	resources	are	reported	to	be	new	developments.	
Second,	the	frequency	of	conflicts	in	Dassanech	increased,	and	this	became	evident	more	in	
the	last	three	years	than	ever	before.	Although	there	exist	no	benchmark	records	to	compare	
changes	in	the	frequency	of	conflict	occurrence,	both	community	members	and	government	of-
ficials	underlined	that,	in	the	past,	conflict	occurred	intermittently	and	reconciliation	lasted	for	
years	(sometimes	up	to	ten	years).	Today,	on	the	contrary,	peace	deals	are	broken	shortly	(within	
days,	weeks	or	months)	after	agreements	and	unprovoked	attacks	are	perpetrated	repeatedly.
 
Third,	the	allegations	about	commercial	raiding	and	the	involvement	of	elements	of	the	Ke-
nyan	security	force	in	attacks	and	raids	is	a	new	development	in	the	conflict	dynamics.	Infor-
mation	obtained	during	the	present	research	and	recent	studies	in	the	area	(Gebre-Michael	et	
al	2005;	Teshome	2010)	point	to	the	presence	of	commercial	interest	groups	(e.g.,	traders,	arms	
dealers,	and	paid	professional	raiders)	behind	livestock	raiding	and	conflict	 in	fishing	areas.	
Some	Dassanech	informants	reported	to	have	personally	witnessed	the	participation	of	some	
Kenyan	security	forces	in	Dassanech-Turkana	conflicts.	Others	reported	to	have	produced	evi-
dence	to	woreda	authorities	to	support	their	claims.	The	proofs	the	local	people	handed	over	
to woreda	authorities	included	heavy	weapons,	shells	of	heavy	weapons,	military	uniforms,	and	
identity	cards	of	Kenyan	security	forces.	
3. Food security/insecurity and its relation to conflict in Dassanech
3.1 Livelihood strategies
The	economy	of	the	Dassanech	is	based	on	livestock	production,	crop	production,	and	fishing	
(in	that	order	of	social	importance).	Animals	(especially	cattle)	are	given	high	social	value	and	
represent	status	symbols.	Hence,	they	are	not	meant	to	be	sold	or	killed	except	in	drastic	situ-
ations	 (e.g.,	 food	 shortage)	 and	 socially/culturally	 justified	 reasons	 (e.g.,	 festivity).	The	 youth,	
the	children,	and	the	few	adults	 living	in	the	cattle	camp	largely	subsist	on	milk	and	blood.	
Occasionally,	they	consume	some	grain	that	they	bring	from	the	villages,	where	the	majority	of	
people	live.	While	the	majority	of	animals	are	sent	to	the	cattle	camp,	some	milking	cows	and	
small	ruminants	are	kept	in	the	vicinity	of	the	permanent	villages.
According	to	data	from	the	Department	of	Agriculture,	South	Omo	Zone,	the	livestock	size	in	
Dassanech	increased	from	599,420	in	2004/2005	to	over	844,275	in	2009/2010.	The	data	also	re-
veal	that	large	numbers	of	animals	were	lost	in	this	period.	Since	2007/2008,	for	example,	the	
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number	of	cattle	has	been	decreasing	and	this	coincided	with	the	intensification	of	drought	
and	escalation	of	conflicts.	The	animals	may	have	been	lost	due	to	disease,	drought,	or	raids.
Table	1.	Estimated	livestock	population	in	Dassanech	woreda,	2006/2007	-	2010/2011
Year Livestock	Type Total
Gregorian Ethiopian Cattle Goats Sheep Donkeys Camel
2009/10 2002 224,621 381,427 224,637 13,285 305 844,275
2008/9 2001 226,867 389,055 229,027 22,556 300 867,805
2007/8 2000 280,380 206,185 156,700 41,172 265 684,702
2006/7 1999 270,000 206,000 156,000 40,000 265 672,265
2005/6 1998 219,380 206,185 105,405 14,144 250 545,364
2004/5 1997 219,380 206,185 156,740 16,850 265 599,420
Source:	Department	of	Agriculture,	South	Omo	Zone
Socially,	crop	production	is	given	a	secondary	importance	in	Dassanech	society.	However,	the	
daily	diets	of	those	living	in	permanent	settlements	depend	more	on	grain	than	animal	pro-
ducts.	Crop	production	depends	on	the	traditional	flood	retreat	cultivation	(which	constitutes	
the	major	part)	and	 limited	 irrigation	schemes	 (which	make	small	contributions).	Normally,	
light	rainfall	is	expected	in	March	and	April	and	flood	from	highland	Ethiopia	in	the	months	
of	June,	July	and	August.8	The	flood	retreat	production	season	spans	from	September	to	the	end	
of	December.	Due	to	the	seasonal	variability	of	rainfall	characterized	by	delay,	the	production	
season	sometimes	spans	from	November	to	February.	The	irrigation	schemes	utilize	windmills	
supplied	by	the	government	and	the	Society	of	International	Missions	(formerly	Sudan	Interior	
Mission,	SIM)	and	engine-pumps	provided	by	the	government.	The	number,	the	total	irrigation	
capacity,	and	functional	status	of	the	windmills	and	the	pumps	are	summarized	below.	
Table	2.	Irrigation	scheme	in	Dassanech	woreda	
Irrigation Supplied	by No. Capacity	
(Total	ha)
Functional	Status Remarks
Functional	 Out	 of	
order
Windmill Government	 22 0 22
SIM 63 31.5 63 63 capacity	per	unit	=	0.5	ha
Pump Government 51 367 35 15 three	 different	 types	 of	
pumps	 with	 their	 unit	
capacity	 ranging	 from	 3	
to	22	hectares
Source:	Office	of	Agriculture,	Dassanech	Woreda
8	 	These	seasonal	cycles	of	rain	and	flooding	are	used	to	monitor	and	predict	food	security/insecurity.
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As	indicated	in	the	table	below,	in	the	last	five	years	the	size	of	cultivated	land	increased	from	
6,722.5	ha	to	10,974.2	ha.	 It	 is	obvious	from	the	data	 that	 the	size	of	flood	retreat	cultivation,	
especially	sorghum	production,	shows	significant	increase.	Although	the	total	area	of	irrigated	
land	is	very	small,	the	size	increased	by	more	than	twofold	in	five	years.	One	of	the	challenges	
witnessed	with	the	pump	irrigation	is	the	cost	of	fuel	and	maintenance,	which	raises	serious	
sustainability	concerns.	The	woreda	is	planning	to	convince	the	agro-pastoralists	to	produce	se-
same	and	onion	as	cash	crops	on	their	irrigated	fields.	At	least	for	now,	however,	the	local	people	
are	only	interested	in	producing	food	crops	–	particularly	sorghum	and	some	maize.	After	one	
year,	the woreda plans	to	handover	the	entire	management	responsibility,	including	covering	
the	cost	of	fuel,	to	the	communities.	It	appears	rather	ambitious	to	expect	the	communities	to	
manage	the	costly	pump	irrigation	scheme	at	this	early	stage.	In	contrast,	the	windmill	provi-
ded	by	the	SIM	is	likely	to	be	sustainable	because	of	low	cost	(only	Birr	500	per	mill)	and	less	
complicated	maintenance	requirement.	
Table	3.	Cultivated	land	in	hectare	in	Dassanech	Woreda
Year Sorghum	Field Maize	Field Other	Crops*
Cultivated	Area	(ha)Flood	
Retreat
Irrigated Flood	
Retreat
Irrigated Flood	
Retreat
Irrigated
Irrigated Total
2010/11 9,538 6.5 495 115 489 330.66 452.16 10,974.16
2009/10 3,925 25 35 150 12.5 82 257 4,229.5
2008/9 3,776 80.25 1,081 79.88 153 20 180.13 5,190.13
2007/8 - - - 17 - 1 18 18
2006/7 5,704 50 666 143 137 22.5 215.5 6,722.5
Source:	Office	of	Agriculture,	Dassanech	Woreda
*	The	other	crops	(apart	from	sorghum	and	maize)	grown	in	Dassanech	include	beans,	sesame,	onion,	
tomato,	pepper,	banana,	groundnut,	sweat	potato,	taro,	and	mango.	All	but	beans	were	introduced	into	
Dassanech	by	the	woreda	department	of	agriculture	in	recent	years	and	are	still	at	the	trial	level.
Due	to	poor	rainfall	and	absence	of	flooding	in	2008/2009,	the	total	cultivated	land	in	2009/2010	
(4,229.5	ha)	was	less	than	the	size	in	the	previous	years.	Apart	from	this,	the	22	big	windmills	and	
some	of	the	engine	pumps	were	not	functioning.	Moreover,	fuel	shortage	(due	to	unreliability	
of	supply	and	financial	constraints)	and	maintenance	problems	contributed	to	the	crop	failure	
in	that	year.	The	total	size	of	land	cultivated	in	2008/2009	was	also	less	than	the	total	area	cul-
tivated	in	2006/2007	for	the	same	reasons.	The	2010/2011	harvest	turned	out	much	better	than	
the	previous	years	because	it	had	rained	in	2009/2010	and	also	the	woreda was	better	prepared	
to	provide	assistance.	The	year’s	cultivated	area	of	irrigated	sorghum	(6.5	ha)	was	very	low	due	
to	lack	of	interest	on	the	part	of	the	people.	Since	the	number	of	irrigation	users	is	low,	people	
were	worried	that	sorghum	crops	planted	in	few	fields	will	be	vulnerable	to	bird	attacks.	Hence,	
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according	to	an	agricultural	expert	of	Dassanech	woreda,	they	expressed	interest	in	growing	ve-
getables,	and	that	is	why	the	irrigated	field	of	other	crops	(330.66	ha)	was	higher	that	year	than	
ever	before.	
 
3.2 Perception and reality of food security/insecurity
3.2.1 The level of food security/insecurity 
Although	intermittently,	many	households	in	Dassanech	woreda	have	been	receiving	emergency	
food	aid	for	decades	now	and	almost	every	year	since	2004/2005.	According	to	a	former	Das-
sanech	woreda	official,	in	1998/1999	and	1999/2000,	the	entire	Dassanech	kebeles	received	emer-
gency	food	aid.	In	2009/2010,	in	all	39	kebeles,	about	30,000	people	(almost	two-thirds	of	the	total	
population)	were	on	emergency	food	assistance.9	In	2011,	only	10,149	individuals	from	14	kebeles 
(including	Omorate	town)	qualified	for	emergency	food	assistance.	In	other	words,	26	kebeles 
(most	located	on	the	western	side	of	the	Omo	River)	are	considered	food	secure.	
However,	several	informants	in	one	of	the	‚food	secure‘	kebeles visited	by	the	researcher	indi-
cated	 that	 the	emergency	aid	 terminated,	while	 they	were	 still	 in	need	of	 assistance,	 simply	
because	the	woreda	experts	reported	to	higher	officials	that	the	communities	were	food	secure.	
They	further	noted	that	those	households	who	grew	crop	in	the	Omo	delta	close	to	the	lake	had	
enjoyed	good	harvest,	while	those	who	waited	for	the	riverbank	flood	and	some	of	those	who	
depended	on	irrigation	had	got	no	harvest	in	that	year.	Interviews	with	government	officials	
revealed	that	in	the	last	few	years,	the	amount	of	flood	substantially	decreased	for	two	main	re-
asons:	lack	of	rain	and	the	holding	back	of	water	to	fill	the	Gibe	dams.	Some	of	the	households	
who	trusted	the	irrigation	schemes	experienced	production	failure	due	to	technical	problems	
with	the	pumps	and/or	fuel	shortage.
Apart	from	the	emergency	humanitarian	aid,	a	total	of	9,514	people,	selected	from	all	40	kebeles,	
have	been	receiving	aid	through	the	productive	safety	net	program	since	January	2005.10	The	
majority	of	the	recipients	(over	8,600	people)	are	supposed	to	participate	in	public	work	such	
as	the	construction	of	roads,	fences,	toilets,	and	waterholes.11	However,	these	requirements	have	
9	 	The	government	has	mechanisms	to	determine	the	food	security	status	of	communities	and	screen	
the	number	of	households	that	deserve	humanitarian	assistance.	In	each	food	insecure	kebele,	not	all	
households	are	entitled	to	food	aid.	The	main	criteria	employed	to	assess	the	food	security	status	of	
communities	 include	 food	 price,	 weather	 conditions,	 crop	 production,	 animal	 health,	 and	 human	
health.	The	determination	of	food	secure	and	food	insecure	households	depends	on	the	availability	of	
dependable	economic	assets	at	their	disposal.	
10		The	productive	safety	net	program	is	a	food	security	strategy	that	aims	at	(1)	providing	households	
with	enough	income	(cash/food)	to	meet	their	food	gap	thereby	protecting	their	household	assets	from	
depletion	and	(2)	building	community	assets	to	contribute	to	addressing	the	root	causes	of	food	inse-
curity.
11		The	aged,	the	sick,	and	those	physically	impaired	were	given	free	assistance.	
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not	been	enforced	and	nothing	visible	has	been	accomplished	through	the	program.	No	as-
sessment	has	been	made	to	find	out	whether	 the	 living	conditions	of	 the	beneficiaries	have	
improved	as	a	result.	Despite	the	increase	in	the	family	size	of	the	participants,	the	amount	of	
support	per	month	remained	the	same	since	the	beginning.	New	recipients	have	not	been	ac-
cepted	despite	the	growing	number	of	destitute	households	in	the	woreda. 
Of	the	39	rural	kebeles,	28	are	located	along	the	Omo	River	and	some	of	the	residents	practice	
cultivation	while	those	living	in	the	remaining	eleven	kebeles	reside	far	away	from	the	river	and	
rely	heavily	on	livestock	production.	Over	the	years,	agricultural	production	in	the	riverbank	is	
reported	to	have	expanded,	although	rainfall	shortage	remains	to	be	a	serious	challenge.	The	
production	increase	is	expressed	in	terms	of	the	participation	of	many	households	in	cultiva-
tion,	the	expansion	of	cultivable	land,	the	selling	of	agricultural	products	in	Omorate	market,	
the	introduction	of	new	crops,	and	the	use	of	irrigation	schemes.	
Agricultural	extension	services	are	almost	non-existent	 in	 the	eleven	kebeles	 located	far	away	
from	the	Omo	River.	Hence,	most	people	(if	not	all)	in	these	areas	have	continued	to	receive	
emergency	food	aid	for	many	years	now.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	residents	are	purely	no-
madic	pastoralists.	Some	of	them,	particularly	those	in	Narich	area,	produce	sorghum	on	the	
alluvial	deposit	brought	by	the	seasonal	river	called	Keske.	It	is	important	to	note	that	some	
households	 are	 considered	 food	 secure	 and	 denied	 access	 to	 emergency	 aid,	 although	 this	
caused	resentment	on	the	part	of	some	members	of	the	community.	From	interviews	with	key	
informants	it	became	evident	that	those	who	receive	aid	share	with	those	who	do	not.	
3.2.2 Meaning and reasons of food security/insecurity
There	is	no	Dassanech	term	that	adequately	represents	the	concepts	of	food	security	and	in-
security.	The	phenomenon	of	food	insecurity	is	described	in	terms	of	prolonged	hunger	(that	
may	involve	related	sickness	and	death)	due	to	the	absence	of	sufficient	food	to	eat.	Although	
the	culture	of	sharing	is	strong	in	Dassanech,	the	poor	(those	with	few	or	no	livestock,	no	fami-
ly	members	in	the	Omo	delta,	and	those	without	irrigable	land	along	the	river)	are	the	victims	
of	food	crises.	Those	households	with	many	livestock	could	spare	some	to	buy	food.	Likewise,	
households	with	livestock,	family	members,	and	farms	in	the	Omo	delta	near	the	lakeshore	are	
likely	to	survive	better	than	those	without.	Hence,	prolonged	hunger	does	not	necessarily	affect	
all	households	in	the	same	way.	The	extreme	level	of	food	insecurity	known	to	the	Dassanech	
was	manifested	in	malnourishment	and	death	of	children,	increased	death	of	livestock,	large-
scale	migration	of	people	and	animals	to	the	delta	and	other	resource-rich	areas,	and	reliance	
on	food	aid.
According	to	informants,	food	insecurity	is	caused	mainly	by	the	lack	of	rain	and	prolonged	
drought	spells.	These	phenomena	destroy	the	asset-base	of	communities	thereby	rendering	the	
social	networks	and	the	sharing	culture	meaningless	simply	because	there	isn‘t	enough	to	sha-
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re.	As	the	livelihood	of	the	Dassanech	people	depends	on	livestock	production	and	flood	retreat	
cultivation	of	sorghum	along	the	Omo	River,	rainfall	is	a	critical	factor	for	their	survival	strate-
gy.	During	the	rainy	season,	Lake	Turkana	fills	up	and	water	flows	backward	flooding	upstream	
areas.	Since	the	rain	makes	water	and	grass	available	in	areas	away	from	the	lake	and	the	river,	
people	move	with	their	livestock	in	different	directions	to	exploit	these	resources.	When	the	
rain	stops	and	the	water	level	in	the	river	and	the	lake	recedes,	most	of	the	animals	are	taken	
back	to	the	riverbank,	the	delta,	and	other	permanent	water	points.	The	fertile	alluvial	sediment	
along	the	river	and	the	delta	is	cultivated.	
3.2.3 Trends in food security/insecurity
It	is	difficult	to	predict	food	security/insecurity	in	Dassanech	in	the	future.	However,	from	the	
interviews	with	key	 informants	 it	became	clear	 that	 food	 insecurity	of	households	has	been	
increasing	despite	the	intensification	of	cultivation.	Severe	food	shortage	is	not	viewed	as	so-
mething	abnormal.	Regarding	the	future,	there	are	two	different	indicative	trends	at	play.	First,	
increasing	temperature	and	deceasing	precipitation	change	may	negatively	affect	local	liveli-
hoods	and	food	security.	Second,	the	Ethiopian	government	is	trying	to	make	the	Omo-Gibe	
river	basin	one	of	the	development	corridors	in	the	country,	and	this	will	have	an	effect	on	food	
security/insecurity	of	the	area.	
The	development	programs	currently	underway	in	the	area	include	the	construction	of	dams	
for	hydroelectric	power	(Gibe	I,	Gibe	II,	and	Gibe	III),	the	development	of	150,000	hectares	of	
sugarcane	plantation,	and	the	construction	of	six	sugar	factories.	Africa	Oil	and	other	compa-
nies	(namely,	Agriterra	and	Tullow)	are	exploring	oil	in	South	Omo	Zone	in	an	area	that	covers	
29,465	km2.	Part	of	the	Dassanech	territory	is	within	the	exploration	area.12 In	the	past,	the	Das-
sanech	communities	did	not	benefit	from	large-scale	agricultural	projects	such	as	the	former	
Ethio-Korean	state	 farm	and	the	 three	recent	commercial	 farms.	Neither	 irrigation	schemes	
nor	pasturelands	have	been	developed	for	the	pastoralists	to	compensate	for	the	land	that	they	
lost	to	these	large-scale	farms.	In	view	of	these	facts,	the	question	of	how	the	dam,	the	sugar,	and	
the	oil	projects	will	affect	the	pastoral	communities	in	the	area	remains	to	be	seen.	
According	to	the	authorities,	the	plan	for	pastoralists	in	the	lower	Omo	valley	is	to	establish	
permanent	settlements	and	to	promote	the	adoption	of	irrigated	agriculture.	The	new	lifestyle	
is	believed	to	stop	pastoral	movement	in	search	of	water	and	grass,	the	subsequent	conflict	over	
resources,	 and	allow	efficient	provision	of	 social	 and	extension	 services.	The	 intention	 is	 to	
convince	the	pastoralists	to	use	the	irrigation	opportunity	and	pursue	livestock	production	that	
focuses	on	quality	rather	than	quantity.	Some	of	the	informants	in	Dassanech	do	not	seem	to	
have	clear	information	about	the	planned	project	and	the	way	it	will	affect	their	future.	Others	
who	 knew	 about	 the	 dams	 and	 sugar	 project	 expressed	worries	 that	 the	 new	developments	
may	disrupt	their	livelihoods	and	exacerbate	inter-ethnic	conflicts.	Local	officials,	development	
12		http://www.tullowoil.com/index.asp?pageid=429
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workers,	and	some	Dassanech	viewed	the	planned	grand	projects	as	representing	a	great	deve-
lopment	opportunity	for	the	area	at	large.	
3.3 Drought, rainfall, food (in)security and local conflicts 
When	the	dry	spells	intensify,	people	and	livestock	concentrate	in	resource-rich	areas,	and	it	
is	at	this	time	that	resource-related	conflicts	surface.	Among	the	Dassanech,	however,	violent	
conflict	is	not	considered	as	the	only	option	to	address	scarcity.	Informants	stressed	the	im-
portance	of	tolerance	in	the	face	of	threat	to	save	human	and	animal	lives.	An	elderly	man	from	
Rate	village	stated:
“Some	years	ago,	we	moved	to	Kare	[an	area	between	Dassanech	and	Nyangatom]	with	our	
animals.	Kare	has	sufficient	grass	and	water.	 It	 is	also	good	for	cultivation.	Some	people	
decided	not	 to	go	with	us	because	of	 the	Nyangatom	threat	 […]	Upon	arrival,	we	started	
sharing	the	land	with	them	in	peace.	After	some	time,	they	[the	Nyangatom]	killed	my	two	
sons.	They	killed	other	boys.	They	stole	our	animals.	We	could	have	taken	revenge.	But	we	
said,	‘let	our	loss	be	the	price	for	the	grass’.	We	thought	that	revenge	would	drive	us	into	
more	killings	and	loss	of	access	to	grass.”	(Rate,	13	July	2011)
Despite	 the	 initial	 tolerance	 stance	 of	 the	Dassanech,	 tension	 and	 conflict	 between	 the	 two	
groups	 in	Kare	 area	 escalated	 as	 the	drought	 intensified.	Rainfall	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	pacify	
resource-related	conflicts	in	that	when	it	rains	tension	over	resources	reduces	as	the	herders	
would	have	fallback	options	elsewhere.	The	Kare	conflict	mentioned	above,	for	example,	subsi-
ded	when	the	Dassanech	pulled	back	following	rainfall	that	made	grass	and	water	available	in	
other	places.	Sometimes	herders	are	reported	to	tolerate	offensive	actions	and	take	revenge	at	
the	end	of	the	drought	period	immediately	before	abandoning	the	contested	area.	One	infor-
mant	explained	how	his	group	in	the	1980s	tolerated	the	Hamar	attacks	and	retaliated	when	the	
rainfall	gave	them	a	breathing	space:	
“There	was	no	grass	and	no	water	here.	Some	of	our	people	went	to	the	Omo.	We	went	to	
Narema	[an	area	between	Dassanech	and	Hamar].	Narema	was	our	land.	The	Hamar	claim	
that	it	is	theirs	[…]	When	we	arrived	there,	the	Hamar	said,	‘Go	to	the	Omo.	You	have	an	
option	there.	We	cannot	go	anywhere	for	lack	of	other	option’.	But	we	told	them	that	some	
of	our	people	already	went	to	the	Omo.	The	delta	is	not	sufficient	for	the	residents	and	the	
many	new	comers	[…]	The	Hamar	started	to	kill	our	people.	[…]	We	did	not	want	to	give-up	
Narema.	We	agreed	to	pay	a	blood	price	for	the	grass	[…]	When	the	rain	came,	we	started	to	
move	south.	We	sent	the	elderly,	women,	and	children	together	with	most	of	the	livestock.	
We	kept	few	animals	behind	with	some	30	strong	men	for	few	days.	We	launched	a	major	
attack	on	a	Hamar	village	and	raided	their	animals.	Most	of	us	chased	the	animals	deep	into	
our	territory.	Few	sharp-shooters	and	fast-runners	stayed	behind	to	stop	the	Hamar	from	
tracking	us	[…]	We	all	escaped	unharmed.”	(Hadho,	19	July	2011)
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According	to	Dassanech	 informants,	conflicts	arise	and	escalate	 in	wet	seasons	and	at	 times	
of	abundance	for	a	number	of	other	reasons.	In	wet	seasons,	the	availability	of	water	and	food	
allows	fighters	to	travel	long	distance	and	hide	in	the	bush	for	days	to	ambush	their	victims.	Ab-
undance	allows	communities	to	organize	cultural	events	and	major	ceremonies.	During	feasts	
heroes	and	their	families	are	honored	through	songs	and	special	treatments.	Some	informants	
noted	that	during	such	ceremonies	some	youth	are	agitated	to	perpetrate	killing	for	fame	and	
prestige.	
As	mentioned	above,	the	Dassanech	people	have	been	receiving	emergency	humanitarian	aid	
for	 several	decades,	 though	 intermittently.	Many	relief	aid	recipients	are	 reported	 to	be	sel-
ling	their	emergency	food	aid	to	buy	liquor	transported	from	Omorate	town	to	the	villages	by	
young	dealers.	The	consumption	of	alcohol	is	on	the	rise	throughout	the	Dassanechland	and	
is	becoming	one	of	the	causes	of	disputes.	In	2008,	for	example,	a	peace	deal	signed	in	2006	
between	the	Dassanech	and	the	Turkana	collapsed	when	three	drunken	Dassanech	boys	killed	
three	Turkana	in	Nesuwat	village,	Kenya.	The	Dassanech	Woreda	administration	brought	 the	
perpetrators	to	justice	and	tried	to	convince	the	Turkana	communities	that	the	incident	was	a	
regrettable	tragedy	caused	by	deviant	youths.	However,	the	Turkana	launched	repeated	attacks	
on	the	Dassanech	in	retaliation.
4. Conflict Management/Resolution in Dassanech  
4.1 Coping with conflicts
The	Dassanech	seem	to	have	different	perspectives	on	 the	management	of	 intra-	and	 inter-
ethnic	conflicts.	Disputes	between	individuals,	families	or	communities	within	Dassanech	are	
expected	to	be	resolved	peacefully	with	or	without	the	involvement	of	the	arra council.	Cultu-
rally,	violent	actions	and	acts	of	retribution	against	fellow	Dassanech	are	strongly	disapproved	
and	punished.	This	does	not	mean	individuals	and	families	always	refrain	from	taking	the	law	
into	 their	 hand.	 For	 example,	 physically	 harming	 someone	 in	 revenge	 and	 confiscating	 the	
livestock	of	people	who	failed	to	pay	debt	are	not	uncommon.	However,	if	reported	to	the	arra, 
such	actions	will	have	serious	consequences.
Concerning	inter-ethnic	conflicts,	both	peaceful	resolutions	and	violent	actions	are	viewed	as	
legitimate	options.	Depending	on	a	number	of	considerations	 (e.g.,	 restoration	of	pride,	 the	
need	to	take	revenge,	retrieval	of	livestock,	risks	of	counter-attack,	etc.),	the	Dassanech	may	opt	
for	an	offensive	action	rather	than	for	a	peace	negotiation.	As	long	as	the	violent	action	was	
directed	at	one	of	the	traditional	enemies,	people	would	easily	understand	the	justification.	In	
the	past,	people	waited	for	the	opportune	moment	to	take	revenge.	In	recent	years,	however,	
the	strong	government	pressure	on	communities	to	apprehend	criminals	and	return	raided	or	
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stolen	livestock	changed	perception	about	the	timing	of	retribution.	One	informant	described	
the	situation	as	follows:
“When	they	[the	Dassanech]	take	revenge	against	their	neighbors	months	or	years	later,	they	
are	considered	as	the	first	offenders.	This	is	because	the	attacks	they	suffered	in	the	hands	
of	their	enemies	are	forgotten	as	time	passed.	Nowadays,	they	retaliate	as	soon	as	they	are	
attacked	to	make	it	a	justified	self-defense.	In	May	[2011],	the	Dassanech	killed	22	Turkana	
following	the	death	of	three	Dassanech	in	the	hands	of	the	Turkana	earlier	in	the	day.	This	
is	why	conflict	is	escalating	today.”	(Omorate,	10	July	2011)
By	and	large,	however,	 the	Dassanech	people	seem	to	prefer	peaceful	resolutions	of	conflict.	
The	elders	and	district	level	government	officials	made	repeated	efforts	to	reach	out	to	their	
counterparts	in	the	neighboring	ethnic	groups	to	launch	peace	talks.	Moreover,	the	officials	and	
communities	have	 track	record	of	apprehending	criminals	and	returning	raided/stolen	ani-
mals	to	the	rightful	owners.	In	July	2011,	during	the	research	period,	the	Dassanech	woreda	offi-
cials	were	busy	organizing	three-pronged	peace	negotiations	with	the	Hamar,	Nyangatom,	and	
Turkana.	The	negotiations	with	the	Hamar	and	Nyangatom	involved	the	retrieval	of	livestock,	
and	 the	Dassanech	negotiators	 expressed	 readiness	 to	 respect	 the	 terms	of	 the	 agreements.	
Given	the	history	of	repeated	failed	peace	deals	at	the	local,	district,	and	border	commission	
levels,	the	Dassanech	are	not	optimistic	that	the	usual	style	of	peace	negotiations	would	make	
any	difference.	Hence,	 the	belief	 in	 self-defense	 and	 violent	 retribution	 as	having	deterrent	
effects	is	very	strong.	
4.2 Institutions of conflict management: The Arra
As	indicated	earlier,	the	council	of	the	arra	is	the	most	powerful	decision-making	entity	in	each	
territorial	section	in	Dassanech.	The	arra	is	formed	through	an	initiation	ceremony	held	once	
in	several	decades	for	the	entire	Dassanech.13	All	circumcised	members	of	all	generation-sets	
are	eligible	to	attend	the	inauguration	ceremony.	However,	experienced	elders	and	influential	
young	men	are	recommended	and	encouraged	by	their	peers	and	the	community	to	partici-
pate	in	the	ceremony.	Under	rare	circumstances	some	women	(specially	pregnant	women)	are	
allowed	to	take	part	in	the	inauguration.14	The	delegates	represent	their	sections	and	their	re-
spective	generation-sets.	After	a	month	of	ritual	performances,	the	delegates	return	to	their	re-
spective	sections	to	serve	as	religious	experts,	political	leaders,	and	judges.	They	exercise	power	
over	the	secular	and	religious	lives	of	the	people.	In	worldly	matters	that	concern	their	sections,	
the arra	represent	the	ultimate	decision-making	body.	In	the	realm	of	divine	sanctity,	they	are		
13	 	Some	informants	noted	that	the	arra	inauguration	is	held	every	100	years	and	others	are	of	the	opini-
on	that	it	could	be	held	even	in	50	or	60	years	when	the	number	of	active	arra	decreases.	
14		The	women	who	participated	in	arra	ceremony	become	cooks	for	the	arra council	in	session.
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believed	to	control	the	fertility	of	both	humans	and	animals.	The	last arra ceremony	was	held	
some	30	years	ago	in	Selegn	village,	Shiir	section.
Although	 any	Dassanech	 could	 participate	 in	 the	arra	 inauguration	 ceremony,	 the	 rights	 to	
make	decisions	are	reserved	to	certain	members	of	the	senior	generation-set	known	for	their	
wisdom,	fairness,	and	rich	life	experiences.	There	exists	a	hierarchy	of	power	structure	within				
the arra institution.	The	top	and	ultimate	decision	makers	are	called	the	challeba	 (with	their	
leader	known	as	arraba),	to	whom	cases	are	presented	in	the	nab,	a	secluded	open	space	for	de-
liberation	on	important	internal	matters.15	The	number	of	challeba	presiding	in	any	particular	
nab	would	be	four	or	five,	and	communities	living	in	close	proximity	would	have	one	nab.	The	
second	important	position	is	known	as	nemo,	which	is	constituted	by	influential	and	knowl-
edgeable	elders	responsible	for	advising	the	challeba	and	ensuring	the	execution	of	final	deci-
sions	by	giving	instructions	to	the	tolol,	the	third	position	in	the	hierarchy.	The	tolol	are	like	
foot-soldiers,	who	are	responsible	for	the	actual	implementation	of	decisions	by	the	senior	arra. 
If	the	use	of	force	is	needed,	the	tolol	may	recruit	additional	force	from	the	gus	–	the	youngest	
and	most	energetic	arra members.	The	challeba,	the	nemo,	and	the	tolol are	allowed	to	enter	the	
nab	(with	the	challeba	sitting	in	the	center,	the	nemo	behind	them,	and	the	tolol	behind	the	nemo),	
while	the	other	members	of	the	society	attend	deliberations	as	they	sit	outside	of	the	secluded	
area.	Individuals	in	junior	positions	gradually	get	promoted	to	the	immediately	higher	power	
structure,	although	this	does	not	preclude	merit-based	accelerated	promotion.
4.3 Conflict management: Levels and participants
The	identity	and	participation	of	players	in	conflict	management	vary	depending	on	the	type	
of	conflict	and	level	of	its	management.	Almost	all	intra-ethnic	conflicts	are	managed	within	
the	community	at	different	levels:	family,	age-group,	neighborhood,	and	arra.	Conflicts	between	
married	couples,	co-wives,	 siblings,	and	other	 family	members	may	be	resolved	 through	the	
intervention	of	or	 initiative	 taken	by	 any	 influential	member	of	 the	household	 (usually,	 the	
head	of	the	household).	Serious	family	problems	may	be	taken	to	the	neighborhood	elders	or	
even	to	the arra	if	deemed	necessary.	Disputes	between	neighbors	and	peer	groups	are	taken	to	
the	arra	only	when	they	are	too	difficult	or	complicated	to	address	at	lower	levels.	At	the	lower	
level	of	conflict	management,	there	exists	no	structure	or	procedure	to	follow.	Any	person	with	
modest	reconciliation	skills	is	trusted	to	arbitrate	between	disputing	parties.	However,	matters	
brought	to	the	attention	of	the	arra	are	expected	to	follow	certain	procedures,	such	as	ritualized	
gift	giving	by	the	accuser,	presentation	of	claims	and	counter-claims,	verification	of	evidence,	
the	hearing	of	testimony,	etc.	
15	 	Not	all	people,	and	no	women,	are	allowed	to	enter	the	nab.	Therefore,	common	public	meetings	(e.g.,	
those	organized	by	the	government	officials)	are	held	under	the	shade	of	a	tree.	
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Inter-ethnic	conflicts	are	managed	at	two	or	three	levels	depending	on	whether	the	conflict	is	
domestic	or	cross-border.	These	include	community-based	reconciliation,	woreda-based	peace	
initiatives,	and	bilateral	border	commission	meetings.	The	community-based	approach	repre-
sents	the	customary	dispute	resolution	mechanisms	where	peace	initiatives	are	taken	by	sen-
ding	peace	messengers	to	another	ethnic	group	within	Ethiopia	or	across	the	border	in	Kenya.	
When	the	other	party	agrees	to	resolve	the	conflict	peacefully,	internal	meetings	are	organized	
to	discuss	reconciliation.	Delegates	(senior,	wise,	experienced,	and	articulate	elders)	are	iden-
tified	to	attend	the	peace	negotiations.	During	the	selection	of	delegates,	attempts	are	made	to	
ensure	the	representation	of	the	senior	generation-set	(represented	by	members	of	the	arra),	
members	of	territorial	section	parties	of	the	conflict,	and	members	of	certain	clans.	Other	ac-
tive	players	in	conflict	(e.g.,	youth	and	women)	do	not	take	part	in	the	resolution	largely	because	
the	culture	of	Dassanech	does	not	provide	for	active	participation	of	women	and	children	in	
major	public	matters.	Young	men	may	accompany	the	peace	delegates	largely	to	provide	protec-
tion	to	the	elders	rather	than	to	air	the	voices	of	the	youth.	Women	may	watch	the	proceeding	
and	prepare	food	and	drinks	for	the	participants.	However,	there	is	no	forum	for	them	to	pre-
sent	their	views.	
 
The	woreda-based	peace	initiative	relates	to	official	peace	activities	(e.g.,	meetings,	accords,	and	
festivals)	organized	by	authorities	of	adjacent	border	districts	on	their	own	or	in	collaboration	
with	other	agencies	working	on	peace	(e.g.,	CEWARN	and	NGOs).	After	a	major	conflict	inci-
dence	or	series	of	small	conflicts,	one	district	official	may	reach	out	to	one	or	more	neighboring	
districts	in	Ethiopia	and/or	Kenya	with	a	proposal	for	a	peace	meeting.	When	the	proposal	is	ac-
cepted,	the	date	and	venue	are	fixed	in	consultation.	During	such	meetings,	the	Dassanech	are	
represented	by	woreda	officials,	representatives	of	elders,	and	in	some	cases	by	representatives	
of	NGOs.	In	most	cases,	the	representatives	of	elders	are	randomly	chosen	by	woreda	officials	or	
partner	NGOs	rather	than	by	the	community.	Hence,	the	representation	of	senior	generation-
sets,	territorial	sections,	and	relevant	clans	are	rarely	ensured.	Sometimes	the	delegates	from	
the woreda administration	and	the	partner	NGOs	are	reported	to	put	pressure	on	the	elders	to	
accept	terms	of	agreement	that	they	would	otherwise	reject.	The	flaw	in	the	selection	of	elders	
and	the	pressure	to	make	them	accept	peace	deals	significantly	reduce	their	credibility,	which	
in	turn	reduces	public	recognition	and	respect	for	the	reconciliation.	
Bilateral	border	commission	meetings	represent	the	third	peace-making	approach.	When	the	
local	peace	initiatives	fail	and	conflicts	escalate	unabated,	the	Governments	of	Ethiopia	and	Ke-
nya	organize	high-level	meetings	through	their	border	commissions.	The	latest	such	meeting	
was	held	in	late	May	2011	in	Kenya	following	the	4	May	2011	incident	in	which	22	Turkana	and	
three	Dassanech	were	killed.	Two	years	ago,	similar	bilateral	meetings	were	held	in	October	2009	
at	Nakuru	(Kenya)	and	November	2009	at	Hawassa	(Ethiopia).	The	border	commission‘s	bilate-
ral	meetings	are	attended	by	government	officials	of	the	two	countries.	Although	the	woreda	and	
zonal	administrators	attend	such	meetings	as	part	of	the	Ethiopian	delegates,	decisions	were	
often	made	by	the	representatives	of	the	adjacent	regional	governments,	sometimes	through	
imposition	 and	 against	 the	 arguments	of	 the	woreda	 officials.	Except	 in	 follow-up	meetings	
(often	designed	to	ensure	the	implementation	of	earlier	bilateral	decisions),	representatives	of	
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the	local	community	rarely	participate	in	border	commission	meetings	and	decisions.	Since	the	
two	governments	seem	to	be	more	interested	in	stabilizing	the	existing	peaceful	relationship,	
national	interests	have	been	overshadowing	local	concerns.	
5. Conclusion
This	paper	examined	pastoral	conflicts	in	Dassanech	area,	Southern	Ethiopia,	against	the	back-
ground	of	environmental	change	and	food	insecurity.	The	study	points	to	the	presence	of	an	as-
sociation	between	environmental	stress	and	the	escalation	of	inter-ethnic	pastoral	conflicts	in	
the	area.	The	Dassanech	and	their	neighbors	have	been	demographically	expanding.	Population	
growth	and	the	high	social	values	attached	to	livestock	contributed	to	a	steady	increase	in	the	
number	of	animals.	Human	and	animal	population	expansion	occurred	in	a	fragile	environ-
ment	frequently	hit	by	drought	that	diminished	the	carrying	capacity	of	the	area.	The	pressure	
on	 the	scarce	and	 fast-depleting	pasture	and	water	 resources	undoubtedly	escalated	compe-
tition	and	the	subsequent	resource-related	conflicts.	Nevertheless,	the	complexity	of	pastoral	
conflicts	in	Dassanech	poses	tremendous	challenge	in	establishing	direct	causal	links	between	
concrete	 environmental	 factors	 and	 specific	 conflict	 incidents.	 Socio-cultural	 and	economic	
factors	cause	or	trigger	conflicts	independently	or	in	conjunction	with	the	natural	processes.	
For	example,	theft	of	livestock	and	individualized	killings	for	fame	and	to	acquire	guns	flame	
inter-ethnic	tension.	The	involvement	of	elements	of	security	forces	in	the	cross-border	attacks	
and	the	failure	to	respect	previous	peace	accords	agitate	people	to	opt	for	retribution.	Finally,	
the	recent	introduction	of	automatic	rifles	and	liquors	contribute	to	the	occurrence	of	deadly	
conflicts.	
Apart	from	actions	that	trigger	reactions,	government	inactions	allowed	conflicts	to	occur	and	
escalate.	These	include	lax	security	in	the	border	areas	to	take	preventive	actions;	lack	of	insti-
tutional	mechanisms	to	enforce	peace	accords;	lack	of	common	development	projects	to	create	
socio-economic	integration	of	the	conflicting	groups;	absence	of	livelihood	strategies	to	coun-
ter	the	negative	effects	of	climate	change;	and	lack	of	comprehensive	peace	plans.	Neither	the	
traditional	dispute	resolution	approaches	nor	the	official	peace	initiatives	organized	by	govern-
ment	institutions	seem	to	bring	an	end	to	such	conflicts.	Even	worse,	resource-based	deadly	
intra-ethnic	conflict	began	to	occur	for	the	first	time	in	Dassanech.	This	warrants	the	need	to	
identify	the	factors	that	cause,	trigger,	or	exacerbate	conflict	and	devise	a	comprehensive	stra-
tegy	in	which	peace	agreements	should	be	followed	by	border	area	development	interventions	
(e.g.,	 pasture,	 irrigation,	water	points,	 schools,	 healthcare,	 veterinary	 facilities,	 extension	 ser-
vices,	etc.)	to	promote	mutual	cooperation.	
Regarding	development,	some	major	projects	are	already	underway	in	the	Omo	River	basin:	
hydroelectric	dams,	sugarcane	plantation,	sugar	factories,	and	oil	exploration.	From	the	per-
spective	of	some	Dassanech,	some	of	the	major	development	projects	being	implemented	(es-
pecially	the	dams	and	irrigation	schemes)	are	viewed	as	threats	rather	than	opportunities	sim-
Pastoral conflict in Dessanech |  30
ply	because	these	projects	will	drain	their	lifeline	–	floods.	Given	the	lack	of	experience	of	the	
Dassanech	people	in	working	on	plantations	and	in	factories	as	daily	laborers,	one	would	expect	
the	sugar	project	to	cause	influx	of	highland	migrants,	who	will	possibly	overwhelm	the	locals	
and	seize	economic	opportunities	and	social	space.	
On	the	other	hand,	painting	a	gloomy	picture	of	future	development	projects	in	the	area	wit-
hout	concrete	evidence	is	tantamount	to	deconstructive	denial	prospects.	The	new	large-scale	
development	initiatives	in	South	Omo	Zone	may	significantly	contribute	to	the	development	
of	 the	area	thereby	marking	an	end	to	all	social	evils	–	 that	 is,	conflict,	poverty,	disease,	and	
underdevelopment.	This	would	in	fact	depend	on	proper	understanding	of	the	existing	social	
structures	and	people’s	life	choices.	The	Dassanech	people	have	social	structures,	values,	and	
belief	systems	that	govern	their	interactions,	reassure	their	integrity	and	cohesion,	and	provide	
meaning	to	and	control	over	their	lives.	Such	issues	matter	to	the	people	no	less	than	material	
betterment.	Hence,	in	order	to	ensure	greater	control	and	choice	for	the	people	and	avoid	un-
warranted	disruptions	in	their	lives	and	livelihoods,	it	is	crucial	to	undertake	needs	and	envi-
ronmental	assessments	through	baseline	study	before	the	implementation	of	any	development	
project in the area. 
Research Report Series • No. 1 • September 2012  |  31
References
Almagor,	Uri	1978:	Pastoral	Partners:	Affinity	and	Bond	Partnership	among	the	Dassanetch	of	
South-West	Ethiopia.	Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press.
Almagor,	Uri	1979:	Raiders	and	elders:	A	confrontation	of	generations	among	the	Dassanetch.	
In:	Fukui,	Katsuyoshi/Turton,	David	(Eds.),	Warfare	among	East	African	Herders,	Osaka:	
National	Museum	of	Ethnology,	119-145.
Almagor,	Uri	 1983:	Charisma	 fatigue	 in	 an	East	African	 generation-set	 system.	 In:	American	
Ethnologist,	10,	635-649.	
Almagor,	Uri	1986:	Institutionalizing	a	fringe	periphery:	Dassanetch-Amhara	relations.	In:	Don-
ham,	Donald/James,	Wendy	(Eds.),	The	Southern	Marches	of	Imperial	Ethiopia,	Cam-
bridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	96-115.	
Butler,	Christopher/Gates,	Scott	2010:	African	Range	Wars:	Climate,	conflict	and	property	rights.	
Paper	prepared	 for	presentation	at	“Climate	Change	and	Security”	250th	Anniversary	
Conference	organized	for	Royal	Norwegian	Society	of	Sciences	and	Letters,	Trondheim,	
Norway,	21-24	June	2010.	
Carr,	Claudia	1977:	Pastoralism	in	Crisis:	The	Dasanetch	and	their	Ethiopian	Lands.
	 Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago.
Critchley,	W.H.	and	T.	Terriff.	1993:	“Environment	and	Society.”	In	Security	Studies	for	the
	 1990s,	Richard	Shultz,	Ray	Godson	,	and	Ted	Greenwood	(eds),	pp.	312-348.	Washington,	
DC:	Brassey’s.	
CSA	2007:	Summary	and	Statistical	Report	of	the	2007	Population	and	Housing	Census:	Popu-
lation	size	by	age	and	sex.	Addis	Ababa:	Central	Statistical	Authority.
Elfman,	 Peggy	 2005:	Women’s	Worlds	 in	Dassanetch,	 Southern	Ethiopia.	Working	paper	Nr.	
53,	Department	of	Anthropology	and	African	Studies,	 Johannes	Gutenberg	University	
Mainz.
Gebre-Michael,	Yohannes/Hadgu,	Kassaye/Ambaye,	Zerihun	2005:	Addressing
	 Pastoralist	Conflict	in	Ethiopia:	The	case	of	the	Kuraz	and	Hamer	sub-districts	of	
	 South	Omo	Zone.	A	report	submitted	to	African	Peace	Forum,	EPaRDA,	Inter	Africa		
	 Group,	and	Saferworld.
Gebre,	Yntiso	2011:	Understanding	the	Dynamics	of	Pastoral	Conflict	in	Lower	Omo	Valley:		
	 The	case	of	the	Dassanech	and	the	Nyangatom	groups	in	Ethiopia.	A	Final	Report	
	 Submitted	to	Inter	Africa	Group.	Addis	Ababa.
Houtteman,	Yvan	2007:	Concepts	of	illness	and	healing	among	the	Daasanech	of	South	West	
Ethiopia.	Paper	submitted	to	16th	International	Conference	of	Ethiopian	Studies.
Houtteman,	Yvan	2010:	Murder	as	a	Marker	of	Ethnicity:	Ideas	and	practices	concerning	homi-
cide	among	the	Daasanech.	In:	Gabbert,	Echi/Thubauville,	Sophia	(Eds.),	To	Live	with	
Others:	Essays	on	Cultural	Neighborhood	in	Southern	in	Ethiopia,	Köln:	Rüdiger	Köp-
pe,	128-156.
Mburu,	Nene	2003:	Delimitation	of	the	Ilemi	Triangle:	A	History	of	Abrogation	of
	 Responsibility.	In:	African	Studies	Quarterly,	6:4,	online:	http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/
v7i1a2.htm,	3.4.2012.
Negait	Gazeta	2009:	Proclamation	No.	621/2009:	Proclamation	to	provide	for	the
Pastoral conflict in Dessanech |  32
	 registration	and	regulation	of	charities	and	societies.	Addis	Ababa:	Berhania	Selam.	
Sagawa,	Toru	2008:	Local	practices	for	peace	among	‘violent’	pastoralists	in	East	Africa.	Mila:	A	
Journal	of	Institute	of	African	Studies,	University	of	Nairobi,	9,	74-80.	
Sagawa,	Toru	2009:	Why	Do	People	“Renounce	War”?	The	War	Experiences	of	the
	 Daasanach	in	the	Conflict-ridden	Area	of	Northeast	Africa,	Afrasia	Working	Papers	42,	
Afrasian	Center	for	Peace	and	Development	Studies,	Ryukoku	University	Kyoto.
Sagawa,	Toru	2010:	Local	potential	for	peace:	Trans-ethnic	cross-cutting	ties	among	the	Daa-
sanach	and	their	neighbors.	In:	Gabbert,	Echi/Thubauville,	Sophia	(Eds.),	To	Live	with	
Others:	Essays	on	Cultural	Neighborhood	in	Southern	in	Ethiopia,	Köln:	Rüdiger	Köp-
pe,	99-127.
Sobania,	Neal	1994:	Independence	and	Ethiopian	expansionism	in	the	early	20th	century,	In:	
Marcus,	Harold	et	al.	(Eds.),	New	Trends	in	Ethiopian	Studies	(1),	Lawrenceville,	NJ:	The	
Red	Sea	Press,	919-927.
Teshome,	Mekonnen	2010:	Cross-Border	Pastoral	Conflict:	The	case	of	Dassanetch	and
	 Nyangatom	in	Southern	Ethiopia.	In:	Institute	of	Peace	and	Security	Studies	and	Fried-
rich	Ebert	Stiftung,	Anthology	of	Peace	and	Security	Research,	Addis	Ababa,	173-217.	
Tsega-ab,	Kassa	2005:	An	Administrative	History	of	Galab	and	Hammer	Bakko	Awuraja
	 (South	Western	 Ethiopia):	 Political	 and	 cultural	 contact,	 1941-1974.	 Unpublished	MA	
thesis,	Department	of	History,	Addis	Ababa	University.
Research Report Series • No. 1 • September 2012  |  33
Interviews and Focus Group Discussions
Date Location Interview/Focus Group Discussion With
02 June 2011 Jinka Official, Representative of Zonal Administration
05 June 2011 Jinka Official, Representative of the Office of Agriculture
06 June 2011 Jinka Expert, Livestock Unit, the Office of Agriculture 
08 June 2011 Jinka Expert, Crop Production Unit, the Office of Agri 
09 June 2011 Jinka Expert, Safety-net and Food Security Unit
10 July 2011 Omorate a pastoral, a former member of the Parliament 
10 July 2011 Omorate a pastoral by from Hadho
11 July 2011 Omorate Official, Representative of Dassanech Woreda
11 July 2011 Omorate Official, Representative of the Office of Agriculture
12 July 2011 Omorate 2 Expert, Safety-net and Emergency Aid, Unit
12 July 2011 Omorate a pastoral, a former member of the Parliament
13 July 2011 Rate 2 elderly pastorals, members of senior generation-set 
13 July 2011 Rate 2 pastoral women 
14 July 2011 Rate FGD with elderly men, women, and youth
15 July 2011 Omorate Official, Representative of Women‘s Affairs
15 July 2011 Omorate a pastoral woman from Koro
15 July 2011 Omorate Expert, Crop Production Unit
16 July 2011 Koro FGD with elderly men including senior generation-set
16 July 2011 Koro FGD with adult women
17 July 2011 Koro FGD with youth
17 July 2011 Koro a youth herder 
18 July 2011 Koro a young pastoral woman
18 July 2011 Koro an elderly man
19 July 2011 Hadho FGD with elderly men and boys
19 July 2011 Hadho an elderly man, member of the senior generation-set
19 July 2011 Hadho two pastoral school boys
20 July 2011 Omorate Expert, Water Development Unit
20 July 2011 Omorate Expert, Crop Production Unit
21 July 2011 Omorate Official, Representative of Dassanech Woreda
23 July 2011 Addis Ababa Official, Representative of the SNNPR
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